The Neighbor's Fire

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As of 2026, with U.S. - Iran military tensions continuing to escalate, the Middle East has once again been pushed to the brink of war. As a neighbor sharing a land border of over 550 kilometers with Iran and heavily dependent on Middle Eastern energy corridors, Türkiye though not a direct party to the conflict feels the scorching heat of this "neighbor's fire" acutely. The U.S. - Iran tension not only impacts Türkiye's already fragile economy through energy prices and trade routes but also poses serious challenges to Ankara's national strategies at the security and geopolitical levels.

The economic transmission mechanism from energy prices to the "Bread Basket"

Türkiye is heavily dependent on imported oil and natural gas, making its economy highly sensitive to fluctuations in international energy prices. The threat posed by the U.S. - Iran conflict to shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz immediately triggered anxiety over energy supply within Türkiye. As early as the initial stages of the escalation, Turkish citizens formed long queues at gas stations out of fear of rising fuel prices and subsequent developments proved these concerns to be well-founded.

Looking at macroeconomic data, Treasury and Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek acknowledged that war-induced oil price increases have created "negative" pressure on the economy. According to official assessments, if the average oil price remains around $85 per barrel in 2026, Türkiye's inflation rate is expected to rise by an additional 3.6 to 4.4 percentage points, while economic growth is projected to slow by 0.6 to 1.5 percentage points. Given that annual inflation stood at 31.5% in February 2026, this additional burden is nothing short of pouring more weight onto an already strained system.

This macroeconomic pressure manifests itself in the most tangible and direct way possible through bread. In Turkish culture, "bread money" (ekmek parası) is synonymous with one's livelihood. However, the U.S.-Israel axis of military operations pushed up energy and flour prices, forcing bread prices to rise sharply. In Ankara, for example, the price of a loaf of sourdough bread jumped from 95 lira to 120 lira. After remaining unchanged for eight months, bread prices across the country were raised by nearly 17%. As local economists have pointed out, the effects of war are not a distant abstraction but a concrete reality squeezing every Turkish family's "bread basket."

The security and foreign policy dilemma between mediation, gedging, and precaution

Faced with a conflict on its doorstep, Türkiye's security and foreign policy posture reveals a complex and pragmatic character.

First, active mediation and diplomatic hedging form the core of its strategy. Türkiye has explicitly opposed any military intervention against Iran and has offered to play a mediating role between Washington and Tehran. Turkish foreign ministers have engaged in intensive diplomatic contacts with Iran and other regional actors, even offering to host potential U.S. - Iran talks on Turkish soil. This mediation effort reflects both a genuine desire to preserve regional stability and Türkiye's broader hedging strategy of balancing between East and West while enhancing its geopolitical influence.

Second, preventing a refugee influx and securing the border constitute Türkiye's most pressing concern. Having already experienced the massive refugee wave from the Syrian civil war, Türkiye is acutely aware of the socio-economic burden that a new wave from Iran could impose. Accordingly, Turkish officials have stated that they are "prepared to strengthen border security measures with Iran" including the construction of physical barriers if necessary. At the same time, Ankara has firmly denied allegations of "plans to invade Iranian territory," emphasizing its respect for its neighbor's sovereignty.

Finally, the Kurdish question has resurfaced as a critical strategic concern. Türkiye fears that Kurdish groups in Iran could capitalize on regional instability to grow stronger, potentially energizing separatist movements among Kurdish populations in Iraq, Syria, and within Türkiye itself. This is precisely why Ankara is eager to see the conflict de-escalate and end quickly, rather than drag on or expand.

In summary, the U.S. - Iran military conflict represents a "neighbor's fire with no winners" for Türkiye. Economically, it strikes at the country's fragile macroeconomic foundation through energy price shocks, directly raising the cost of living for ordinary citizens. In security terms, it brings direct threats ranging from potential refugee flows to the spillover of Kurdish-related instability. For these reasons, Türkiye is simultaneously pursuing a mediating role to lower tensions while reinforcing its border defenses to protect its own interests. The future trajectory of this conflict will continue to profoundly shape Türkiye's domestic and foreign policy in the period ahead.

An analysis of Osman Nuri Koçtürk's "Gıda Emperyalizmi"

In an era where global food prices fluctuate wildly and supply chains are weaponized, the insights of Turkish scientist Osman Nuri Koçtürk remain remarkably prescient. Writing in 1966 and republished in 2009 by the Turkish Chamber of Agricultural Engineers Koçtürk laid bare a chilling reality: food has become the most effective weapon of modern imperialism. His analysis, grounded in decades of scientific observation and personal experience, reveals how developed nations have replaced military occupation with economic manipulation through agricultural policy.

The book opens with a stark observation that resonates even more powerfully today: "Countries are managed through oil, but people are managed through food." This fundamental premise drives Koçtürk's exploration of what he terms "Food Imperialism" the systematic use of food aid, agricultural surpluses, and trade policies to create dependency and extract wealth from developing nations.

The Mechanism of Food Imperialism

Koçtürk's central thesis rests on a simple biological truth: human labor and intellectual capacity depend entirely on adequate nutrition. By controlling a nation's food supply, imperial powers can control its workforce, its health, its educational outcomes, and ultimately its political will.

The author identifies four essential factors of production Man, Money, Materials, and Machinery which American economists summarized as the "4M" formula. While traditional colonialism seized territory through military force, the new colonialism focuses on controlling these four elements, particularly the human element, through economic means.

Perhaps the most striking illustration in the book is Koçtürk's "mouse cage" metaphor: when 40 mice are confined with precisely enough food for 40, they reproduce peacefully. But as the population grows while food remains constant, the colony descends into chaos fighting, cannibalism, and social breakdown. When the population drops back to 40, peace returns. This, Koçtürk argues, is precisely what happens to developing nations whose food supplies are artificially constrained or manipulated.

The Turkish case study: a three-act play

Koçtürk dedicates significant attention to Türkiye's experience, presenting it as a textbook example of food imperialism in action, staged in three distinct acts.

Act one: the meat and milk game

Türkiye once had a robust livestock sector. To dismantle it, imperial powers flooded the market with subsidized powdered milk and frozen poultry at prices below local production costs. Domestic producers were bankrupted, and Turkish citizens gradually shifted from animal protein to a grain-based diet. The result: a population physically weaker and more dependent on imported staples.

Act two: the wheat game

Before World War II, Türkiye was a wheat exporter. Through the US Public Law 480 program, subsidized American wheat was poured into the Turkish market. While this initially appeared as generous aid, its true purpose was to undercut Turkish farmers, who abandoned wheat cultivation for more profitable cash crops like tobacco, cotton, and sugar beets. Within a decade, Türkiye once a breadbasket had become one of the world's largest wheat importers.

Act three: the oil game

Türkiye produces some of the world's finest olive oil. Yet American soybean interests, unable to sell their surplus domestically or in Europe, targeted Türkiye as a new market. Initially, they offered high prices for Turkish olive oil while simultaneously flooding the country with cheap soybean oil. The population was gradually weaned off olive oil and onto margarine. Once this dependency was established, the imperial powers reversed course: they stopped buying Turkish olive oil, drove down its price, and demanded dollars for the soybean oil they had previously offered cheaply. The Turkish government was forced to cancel the agreement, but the damage to the domestic olive oil industry and public health was severe.

The public health consequences

Koçtürk presciently connected these economic manipulations to devastating health outcomes. As margarine consumption rose, so did cardiovascular disease. He cites official Turkish statistics showing a steady increase in heart-related deaths throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. While US scientists and policymakers publicly acknowledged the health risks of hydrogenated oils, their Turkish counterparts influenced by commercial interests actively suppressed this information.

The author does not limit his critique to Western powers. He notes that Eastern bloc nations employ similar tactics, offering vodka factories and cultural exchanges as entry points before establishing economic dependency. The choice between East and West, he warns, is a false one for developing nations.

Disturbing Confessions

Perhaps the most powerful section of Koçtürk's work is his documentation of Western policymakers' frank admissions about food's strategic role. He quotes Don Paarlberg, the first coordinator of the PL 480 food aid program, who stated: "Food given as foreign aid destroys the agricultural markets of recipient countries and discourages their producers. The people of these nations have become victims of 'Food Imperialism.'"

Even more chillingly, Texas Senator Wright Patman declared: "Of all the weapons ever used in international warfare, food is the most effective. The United States possesses this weapon and will maintain its superiority in using it longer than any other nation."

Koçtürk also documents the proposal of Dr. Joseph Goldzieher, who suggested adding sterilizing agents to the public water supply of developing nations to control population growth a proposal that, while rejected, demonstrates the extreme lengths to which imperial thinking can extend.

Solutions and Path Forward

Koçtürk does not simply diagnose the problem; he offers a prescription for liberation. His recommendations are remarkably clear.

1. National Awareness: The first step is public education about food imperialism and its mechanisms. Democracy requires an informed citizenry that can resist manipulation.
2. Food Self-Sufficiency: Developing nations must prioritize agricultural development that meets domestic nutritional needs before pursuing industrial expansion. Without food independence, all other forms of development remain vulnerable.
3. Cultural Defense: Food is not merely fuel; it is an expression of cultural identity. The replacement of traditional foods with imported alternatives is a form of cultural colonization that must be resisted.
4. Strategic Vigilance: Governments must establish rigorous inspection regimes for all imported food, recognizing that contamination whether chemical, biological, or ideological poses a national security threat.
5. Careful Foreign Relations: Neither Western nor Eastern powers offer genuine partnership to developing nations. True independence lies in self-reliance and strategic neutrality.

Contemporary Relevance

Koçtürk's analysis, written during the Cold War, seems almost prophetic in its relevance to today's global food system. The consolidation of global grain markets among a handful of multinational corporations, the use of food aid as a lever for political influence, and the devastating impact of price volatility on food-importing developing nations all confirm his central thesis.

The recent resurgence of "food sovereignty" movements demanding that nations control their own food production represents the kind of resistance Koçtürk advocated. Similarly, growing awareness of how processed foods, particularly seed oils, affect public health echoes his warnings about margarine.

Osman Nuri Koçtürk was a veterinarian and biochemist who understood that nutrition is not merely a biological necessity but a political question of profound importance. His work demonstrates that food independence is not a luxury for developing nations but a prerequisite for genuine sovereignty.

In a world where supply chain disruptions become weapons and where the right to adequate nutrition remains unmet for billions, Koçtürk's message transcends its original context. His call for public awareness, self-reliance, and resistance to economic manipulation remains as urgent today as it was in 1966. The new colonialism, it appears, operates not through armies and battleships, but through the subtle control of what we eat and what we cannot grow ourselves.

"Man is a biological creature as much as he is a social one. Without adequate food, no society can develop, and without food independence, no nation can truly be free."
— Osman Nuri Koçtürk

I had conversations over tea with great people who are older than me.

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On August 29, 2026, we met up with MR. Nihat, a retired soldier, and MR. Tuğrul, a retired teacher, for a pleasant conversation. Over sips of tea, we discussed Türkiye's structural problems and possible solutions.

Having been a soldier, MR. Nihat had the opportunity to serve in various parts of Türkiye and is quite familiar with the country's diverse human cultures. MR. Tuğrul, as a former teacher, has educated thousands of students across many regions of Türkiye and is an experienced educator who has been immersed in different cultures.

MR. Nihat conducts research on philosophy and Turkic languages, and is also writing a thesis on a particular subject. On this occasion, he shared some of his research with me. He is a highly accomplished, very kind, and intellectual individual, shaped by the Republic's educational system. He is a remarkably knowledgeable and highly skilled person. Likewise, MR. Tuğrul is one of the enlightened individuals shaped by the Republic. His former students have gone on to carry out internationally recognized work and have represented Türkiye abroad. For a teacher, this is a tremendous source of pride and honor. On behalf of my country, meeting such valuable people and exchanging ideas with them made me very happy. I once again saw that we need enlightened and intellectual individuals to overcome this dark period Türkiye is going through. We are facing a government that is dragging Türkiye into the quagmire of the Middle East, shaking the fundamental values of the Republic, and disregarding our core values. This government is doing great harm to our country and spending the money of future generations on interest lobbies.

Turkish society needs to be analyzed carefully. The greatest weakness of our society has been 'religion' and politicians have managed to bring certain segments under their influence by engaging in religious peddling. However, it would be very wrong to say that these politicians are pious; they merely use religion as a tool.

The wrongdoings of the government and the deep economic poverty into which it has plunged our country have sparked a awakening of consciousness in society, and the public has now begun to think. Societies that think and question do not become puppets of politicians, because they constantly research and scrutinize what is being done. Under normal circumstances, the general elections planned for 2028 will likely be held in 2027, because the government needs an early election; otherwise, the current President cannot run for reelection. In the general election, which seems likely to take place in 2027, society will make its decision, but this time I believe the public will deal a heavy blow to the government. Because in the previous local elections, society enabled the main opposition party to win many municipalities that had been held by the ruling party, sending a strong message to the government. However, the ruling party, using state power, carried out dawn raids on the mayors elected by the people, forcibly taking them from their homes by police and arresting them after the detention process.

In the history of the Republic of Türkiye, there have been many poor administrations, but never before has there been a government that has wielded state power so recklessly.

Society is remaining silent for now, but when the ballot boxes are set up in the general election, the test for the government will begin. Society will give the government a great lesson and will authorize a new administration to make them pay for what they have done. I believe that the biggest corruption trials in the history of the Republic of Türkiye will be seen, because the government has become entangled in corruption on an incredible scale and has stolen the state's money. I believe that these deeds must not go unpunished and that one day the price must certainly be paid, because society harbors a tremendous anger toward the current government and demands that they be brought to justice.

Knowing that it cannot win the general election under the current circumstances, the ruling government has tried to reduce the opposition's vote share by splitting its votes, but it has not succeeded, because society will give its vote to the party most likely to defeat the government. The '50+1' electoral system currently in place in Türkiye will likely be changed again by the hands of the current government, because under these conditions it does not seem likely to receive 50% of the votes.

Anyway, to return to where we started, MR. Nihat and MR. Tuğrul gave me a new vision and sparked new ideas in my mind. I have gained new perspectives for our program called 'Körfez Masası' (Table of the Körfez), which we broadcast on YouTube, and I have already started working on new projects. I will announce my new projects as soon as possible. So far, we have shot four episodes, and we will soon be with you with Episode 5. Türkiye needs enlightened people more than ever, and this society will never forgive those who are hostile to it.

The agenda in Türkiye changes very rapidly, or there is a desire by some to change it. This is because the deep economic crisis, poverty, and even hunger are creating a massive crisis in the country. The government is busy constantly shifting the agenda to deflect incoming criticism in other directions, but it takes no steps to solve these problems.

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The unfathomable magnitude of the foreign debt, the interest being paid, and the fact that these debts will also have to be paid by future generations are opening deep wounds in the country. Then I sit and think about it, and I conclude that these things are actually being done intentionally. Because no sane person would knowingly surrender the country to such deep poverty and debt. Only those who are someone else's pawn, who commit treason against the homeland, could consciously take these steps.

I believe we are witnessing the final days of this filthy clique that uses the country's resources and engages in shady dealings to amass a fortune of a few hundred billion dollars. It is precisely because they are living their final days that they exhibit such an aggressive attitude. The government, wanting to eliminate the opposition or design it according to its own desires, is engaging in certain shady dealings and trying to do political engineering because it realizes it cannot succeed. However, since these actions have no traction within society, it seems highly unlikely they will succeed.

Ruling powers that lose the support of society are doomed to lose. Parties that gain the support of society will, one way or another, definitely come to power one day and rule the country. Of course, the important issue here, which is also the expectation of society, will be to question the shady dealings of the previous government, have them investigated by an independent judiciary, and prosecute if there is any irregularity. The shady dealings of the government will definitely come to light one day, and steps must be taken to ensure they are not repeated.

Leaving the administration of the state to the initiative of a single person means being dragged into the abyss. Governments that lack the capacity, education, and equipment to rule a country, and that do not feel a sense of belonging to the country, absolutely must not be in charge of the administration. Otherwise, the example of Türkiye should be examined and a lesson must be learned.

A single person must never be the decision-making authority. The Republic of Türkiye is governed by democracy, and the Members of Parliament in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM), who are elected by the public to act as their representatives, should be the authority taking the decisions. That is to say, collective wisdom always develops a country and brings it to prosperity. Countries that are not governed by collective wisdom become trapped in darkness.

Türkiye is not like an Arab country. Neither the society nor the form of government resembles those in Arab countries. Even if it wanted to, it couldn't, because the abundant oil resources found in Arab countries unfortunately do not exist in Türkiye. The administrations of Arab countries (especially those ruled by monarchy) distribute resources as much as possible to keep the society satisfied. They share the oil revenues with the public; otherwise, the public would revolt, and the monarchy would collapse. However, since Türkiye cannot distribute an oil resource it does not possess to the public, it cannot be like Arab countries, and indeed it should not be.

Therefore, the Republic of Türkiye must return to its founding principles and state administration, and it must have robustly functioning institutions. Otherwise, it will sink to the absolute bottom of darkness. Since there will be no deeper bottom left to hit after a while anyway, a rebellion will break out in society.

"The Republic of Türkiye, devotedly founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his comrades-in-arms, will stand forever."

The Turkish society has no problems whatsoever with the Kurdish society. They have lived together without issues under the same roof for centuries and have established neighborhood and kinship relations. That is to say, a Kurdish youth is not subjected to discrimination in the Republic of Türkiye; just like every citizen, they can benefit from all rights. Education, social, justice...

No distinction is made based on language, religion, or race, and everyone is equal before the law.

Long live the Republic, long live Liberty!

Turkish politics has recently been shaken by a rare earthquake. The historic fracture within the Republican People's Party (CHP), which has maintained its position as the main opposition for over two decades, has virtually redrawn the political map. The "New Party" (Yeni Parti), founded by Özgür Özel after he was ousted from the CHP leadership, has quickly become the second-largest power in parliament, causing a reshuffling of the cards in the race for power. So, does this new political entity have the potential to end President Erdoğan's grip on power that has lasted for over two decades?

The Historic Rift in the CHP and the Birth of the New Party

To understand the process, we need to look at the recent past. Taking over the leadership of the CHP in 2023, Özgür Özel brought a breeze of renewal to the party, and this synergy enabled the CHP to surpass the ruling AK Party and become the leading party in the March 2024 local elections for the first time in 22 years. Retaining and winning many metropolitan cities, especially Istanbul, had allowed hopes to blossom on the opposition front.

However, Özel's removal from the chairmanship by a court decision in May and the reinstatement of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu—who had led the party to many defeats in the past—broke the camel's back. Following this process, which many independent observers and human rights organizations interpreted as the "weaponization of the justice system" Özel charted his own path and founded the "New Party" on July 24th.

Splitting parties is not a new phenomenon in Turkish politics. But what made this split historic was its sheer scale. Following Özgür Özel's call, 90 of the CHP's 135 MPs defected to the New Party. While the CHP shrank to the fifth-largest party in parliament with 44 seats, the New Party suddenly took the main opposition seat. Moreover, the fact that Ekrem İmamoğlu—the popular political figure who declared his second victory in Istanbul in 2024 and is currently in the crosshairs of a political ban due to ongoing lawsuits—left his 17-year CHP past behind to join the New Party completely changed the political balance. Polls show the CHP's vote share plummeting below 5%, while the New Party has soared above 30%, making it the AK Party's most serious rival.

Political Balances and 2028 Scenarios

Technically, President Erdoğan's current term expires in 2028, and according to the constitution, parliament must call an early election for him to run again. Many experts expect exactly this to happen. In a potential election, the main factor determining the New Party's chances will be its ability to build a broad "coalition."

At first glance, a divided opposition might seem to benefit the ruling party. For the New Party to overcome this disadvantage, it must go beyond the secular and social democratic base it inherited from the CHP. It needs to establish a wider alliance bloc that encompasses the center-right, nationalists, and Kurdish voters. However, the government's potential reintroduction of a peace process with the PKK carries the risk of detaching actors like the DEM Party from the opposition bloc and further fragmenting it. This situation will be one of the biggest political tests ahead for the New Party.

The Economic Picture and Historical Repetition

In the shadow of political turmoil, the Turkish economy is also facing a tough test. The Central Bank raising its year-end inflation target from 16% to 24%, the sharp 6% drop in the stock market following Özgür Özel's removal from the CHP leadership, and the Turkish Lira's continued slide against the dollar are all factors weakening the government's hand. Judicial crackdowns spooking investors and this fragility in the economy create a significant advantage for the opposition.

On the other hand, it is also possible to draw a historical parallel. The Democrat Party, which broke away from the CHP in 1946, marched to power just four years later, in 1950. The leadership profile of Özgür Özel, who revived the opposition after the disappointment of 2023, could provide the momentum the New Party needs to repeat this history.

A Judicial Vise or a March to Power?

The rise of the New Party has inevitably entered the radar of both the government and the judiciary. The preparation of a summary of proceedings against Özgür Özel on bribery allegations and the request to lift his parliamentary immunity just two weeks after his party's establishment are harbingers of the storm on the horizon.

However, political history shows that pressure and crackdowns do not always yield the desired results. President Erdoğan's own political adventure did not end with the prison sentence he received while serving as the Mayor of Istanbul in the 1990s; on the contrary, it carried him to the Prime Ministry in 2003 and a twenty-year rule thereafter.

If the New Party can withstand the judicial and political pressures, gather the divided opposition under a broad umbrella, and correctly channel the social reaction created by the economic crisis, a potential early election in the coming years could set the stage for a change of hands after a two-decade-long rule.

Recently in Türkiye, the government's increasing pressure and harsh stance against free and independent journalists have been heavily criticized, but the government is not backing down from this attitude. When you criticize bad governance or pursue corruption, they detain you through law enforcement or throw you in jail. In other words, they do not even allow you to practice your profession.

However, the job of journalists is to report everything, good and bad, to the public objectively and to conduct research on their behalf. Because the public might not investigate a topic themselves, and this is the duty of journalists. Yet, in Türkiye, this has become much more difficult for true journalists trying to do their jobs.

The government, forced to release some journalists thanks to public pressure, wants to detain and arrest that person again at the first opportunity. That is to say, they do not want any journalist who does their job properly. This is because journalists play an important role in enlightening the public and changing their opinions.

I salute all journalists who defend independent and free journalism and dedicate their entire lives to this cause.

Journalism is not as easy a profession as people think; on the contrary, they may need to conduct research under incredibly difficult conditions. Especially when an irregularity is detected and there are officials within the government involved, the government strictly opposes its exposure because if it comes to light, the public will react strongly against the government. So, the government prefers to silence journalists because it fears society's reaction, but I think it is impossible for them to do so. In democratic countries, they have never been able to silence journalists; on the contrary, the more they try to silence them, the more new journalists emerge. There are many independent journalists like me who will take on this duty in the public sphere, and their numbers will continue to grow.

In summary, greater support for journalists is crucial.

One day, when the government changes in Türkiye, all the irregularities committed by that government to date will be revealed. These exposed scandals will undoubtedly be investigated by an independent judiciary and will lead to them being brought before a court.

Whoever betrays their country must absolutely be tried as a 'traitor' and treated accordingly.

It is not right to call people patriots who are the lackeys of other countries, who act in accordance with their interests, and who sell out their country; these individuals will definitely be held accountable one day. Knowing this, the government tries to create fear in society and feed off this fear, because it knows there is no other way out.

I believe there will be some major changes in Türkiye very soon, and these changes will profoundly affect the government.

I hope everyone who betrays our country will one day face trial and be held accountable before justice.

Members of Parliament Departing from CHP and the Organizational Dynamics of the New Party

Turkish political history is no stranger to breakaways stemming from internal regulations, leadership friction, and ideological mismatches within mainstream parties, nor to the new political movements that emerge in their wake. In July 2026, the mass resignations within the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the subsequent establishment of the New Party (Yeni Parti) were recorded as one of the most radical institutional transformations experienced by main opposition actors. The New Party — announced after 91 MPs, under the leadership of Özgür Özel, coordinated their resignations via e-Devlet — symbolizes not merely a new entity on the political stage, but a complete reshaping of the power balances within the opposition.

This paper analyzes the founding processes of the New Party — formed by MPs who left the CHP citing that “no other way out was left” — alongside the legal and political dynamics that triggered the split, its impact on the power balances within the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM), and its potential ramifications for Turkish politics.

The Road to Split: Legal Bottlenecks and Intra-Party Polarization

The chain of events leading to the founding of the New Party gained momentum through a series of tensions at the intersection of intra-party management mechanisms and legal/judicial procedures. Bottlenecks within the CHP’s internal regulations and party democracy processes weakened dialogue channels between party organs and the parliamentary group.

Uncertainties in party leadership under judicial rulings and regulation enforcement reinforced the perception among MPs that their room for maneuver was increasingly restricted. Friction surrounding primary election mechanisms, the closure of internal reconciliation channels, and disputes over the binding nature of Party Council decisions made continuing politics under the existing umbrella unsustainable for the intra-party opposition. The emphasis on “necessity” highlighted in the departing group’s declarations was framed not as a mere political choice, but as an obligatory way out imposed by legal and administrative bottlenecks.

Submitting the official petition for establishment to the Ministry of Interior on July 24, 2026 — coinciding with the anniversary of the Treaty of Lausanne — underscored the symbolic dimension of this political maneuver. Registered as the 190th political party in the records of the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Court of Cassation, the New Party immediately positioned itself to influence political dynamics through its substantial parliamentary representation.

Parliamentary Balances and the New Party from an Institutional Perspective

The resignation of 91 MPs created an immediate and profound shift in the parliamentary seat distribution of the TBMM:

• Parliamentary Group Position: Holding 91 seats, the New Party established the second-largest parliamentary group in the TBMM, immediately behind the AK Party.
• Main Opposition Arithmetic: The significant shrinkage of the CHP group brought debates over leadership and representation within the opposition bloc to a new dimension.
• Financial and Legal Framework: Having not yet participated in a general election, the New Party is ineligible for Treasury financial aid under the Law on Political Parties. Consequently, it opted to finance its operations through membership dues, public donation campaigns, and solidarity funds.

Ideological Framework, Centrist Claim, and the Voter Base

The core principles highlighted in the founding declaration of the New Party reflect an intention to build a centrist political movement beyond ideological polarization, alongside the claim of preserving fundamental Republican values:

1. Republican Values and Inclusivity: Operating within the framework of Atatürk’s principles and the National Pact (Misak-ı Millî) values, the party aims to encompass a broad base including conservative, nationalist, and social-democratic segments of society.
2. Focus on Economy and Social Welfare: Rather than engaging in political feuds, the platform prioritizes pressing economic issues, income inequality, and institutional meritocracy.
3. Organizational Model: Completing provincial and district organization across Türkiye in a short period through the participation of former MPs, local administrators, and youth branches has been set as a top priority.

The widespread support from former MPs and provincial organization leaders demonstrates that the party resonates at the grassroots level rather than remaining confined to a parliamentary group.

Conclusion and Effects on Turkish Political Life

The establishment of the New Party proves once again that party formation dynamics in Turkish politics can be driven not only by ideological divergences, but also by clogged channels of intra-party democracy and legal necessities.

The departing group’s assessment that “no other way was left” has opened the opposition’s capacity to manage its internal crises up for debate in the current political system. The New Party’s weight in the TBMM carries the potential to directly influence legislative activities, alliance searches, and vote distribution dynamics in upcoming general elections.

Photo by Christian Lue on Unsplash

References

• Anka News Agency (July 25, 2026). “Özgür Özel resigned from CHP… 91 CHP deputies resigned from their party and became the founders of the NEW Party.”
• Aposto (July 24, 2026). “A ‘new’ era in politics: 91 deputies resigned from CHP and founded the New Party.”
• Medyascope (July 27, 2026). “264 former deputies resigned from CHP, announced support for the NEW Party.”
• Bianet (August 3, 2026). “New Party raised 240.3 million TL in donations in five days / Analysis of TBMM seat distribution and Treasury aid.”
• Wikipedia / Political History Archive (2026). “New Party (2026) — Establishment History, Ideology, and TBMM Process.”

Special Analysis

Executive Summary

This report examines the historical roots of secularism in Türkiye, its foundational role in the Republican project, its current standing under contemporary socio-political dynamics, and the emerging demands of a public calling for political transformation. Beyond a simple separation of mosque and state, secularism in Türkiye serves as the bedrock for equal citizenship, women’s rights, scientific education, and social cohesion. By analyzing the societal impact of more than two decades of religious discourse and institutional shifts under the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), this analysis outlines the contours of the inclusive, liberal secularism required for Türkiye’s second century.

1. From Ottoman Decline to the Republic — The Secular Necessity and Atatürk’s Vision

Unlike Western Europe’s history of direct confrontation between Church and State, the idea of secularism in Türkiye emerged from the institutional decay and urgent modernizing drives of the late Ottoman Empire (Mardin, 1991, p. 45). Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Ottoman reforms — spanning the Tanzimat era (1839) and the Constitutional periods (1876, 1908) — attempted to institute secular legal and educational branches alongside traditional ones. Yet this dual system of religious (sharia) and secular (nizamiye) courts, paired with a fragmented educational landscape, crippled national integration and political unity (Berkes, 2017, p. 210).

Following the collapse of the empire, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the founding leaders of the Republic viewed the rationalization of state authority and public life as essential to securing the new nation-state’s survival and elevating it to the level of “contemporary civilization.” Secularism became the vehicle for disentangling state governance and law from divine doctrine, anchoring them instead in reason and scientific inquiry (Akşin, 2007, p. 112).

The key reformist milestones establishing Turkish secularism unfolded systematically across several critical years:

* March 3, 1924 — The Law on Unification of Education (Tevhid-i Tedrisat): Standardized national schooling, closed religious seminaries (madrasas), and mandated a secular curriculum grounded in modern science.

* March 3, 1924 — Abolition of the Caliphate and the Ministry of Religious Affairs: Completely secularized political authority and dismantled the office of the Sheikh ul-Islam.

* February 17, 1926 — Adoption of the Turkish Civil Code: Replaced sharia law with a modern legal framework modeled on the Swiss Civil Code, laying the foundation for gender equality before the law.

* February 5, 1937 — Constitutional Enshrining of Secularism: Formally designated secularism as an unalterable core feature of the Republic under Article 2 of the Constitution.

Photo by Mehmet Can Özgümüş on Unsplash

 Following the Traces of an Educational Heritage

One of the brightest chapters in the history of Türkiye’s development and enlightenment is undoubtedly the Village Institutes project, launched in the 1940s. Led by the Minister of National Education Hasan Âli Yücel and İsmail Hakkı Tonguç, these institutions were not merely places for teaching literacy; they were production centers that raised individuals “through life itself”, covering everything from agriculture to arts and technical skills to critical thinking. To overcome the current stagnation in Turkey’s education system, what we need is not to physically bring back these institutions, but to restructure their philosophy of “education within work, through work, and for work” with a modern vision.

Systemic Collapse and the Need for Village Institutes

Our current education system is structured to provide a theoretical information overload that fails to integrate knowledge with production. The Village Institutes were a model where knowledge was not just memorized in a classroom but applied in the fields, workshops, and laboratories. In the Türkiye of tomorrow, education must teach individuals not just “what to think”, but “how to produce” and “how to solve” in a world where technology and industry are changing rapidly.

Students taking agriculture lessons and teachers instructing them at Village Institutes, Türkiye’s educational reform.

The First 100 Days and Beyond: A New Restructuring Plan

A fundamental repair of education following a change in administration can be built upon “New Generation Technology and Life Institutes”, the modern versions of the Village Institutes:

• Production-Oriented Schools: A campus model where education buildings do not only consist of classrooms but also include agricultural areas, software labs, and design workshops.
• Reform in Teacher Training: The greatest achievement of the Village Institutes was training teachers as “community leaders”. Priority should be given to training teacher candidates equipped not only with pedagogical knowledge but also with the technical and social skills to solve societal problems.
• Regional Curriculum: Every region of Türkiye has different needs. Specialized educational units should be established, focusing on agricultural technologies in the Aegean, industry and artificial intelligence in Marmara, and renewable energy in the Southeast.

Modernizing the Philosophy of the Village Institutes

It is a great misconception to label the Village Institutes as “old”; on the contrary, this model was a much more advanced version of today’s “project-based learning” or “STEM” education. Three core principles must be preserved in the new restructuring:

1. Democratic Governance: An environment where students and teachers have a say in school management and where critical thinking is encouraged.
2. Culture and Arts: In the Institutes, every student was required to play an instrument and read world classics. In the new system, arts and philosophy should not be electives but fundamental pillars that develop intelligence.
3. Integration with Society: Schools should develop alongside the people in their surroundings, producing scientific solutions to local problems.

A Return to Enlightenment

Turkey’s escape from its economic and social impasse depends on making a transition from “Quantity to Quality” in education. The Village Institutes were a project that trusted the potential of the Anatolian people. The new educational order we establish in the Türkiye of tomorrow must promise our children not just a diploma, but a free mind, productive hands, and a bright future.

A strong Türkiye will be rebuilt on the day when knowledge meets production in its classrooms and every child grows up with self-confidence, just like an “instituter”.

 “Point Zero” of Politics: A Transition Scenario for Türkiye Post-Election

The end of an era and the quest for a new beginning; in Turkish political history, elections are not merely about the results emerging from the ballot box, but are also society’s search for a ‘new social contract.’ In particular, the allegations surrounding the use of public resources, tender processes, and the relationship with state institutions necessitate the establishment of not just a new government, but a new ‘order of law and transparency’ following the election.

So, after a process filled with such exhaustion and allegations, how can a new administration repair this damage?

The First 100 Days: Stopping the Bleeding When you take over the administration of a state, the first 100 days are not about ‘showcase projects’ but a period of ‘assessment and stabilization.’ The primary goal during this timeframe is to place the gears of the system on a rational and transparent foundation:

Taking an X-ray Transparently revealing the true dimensions of the Treasury and public liabilities.

Restoring Confidence Rebuilding the trust of market players and citizens in institutions like the Central Bank and TURKSTAT through merit-based appointments.

Administrative Pause Temporarily freezing large-scale expenditures until the flow of public resources is fully understood.

Legal Accountability or Revenge? This is the most critical threshold. In a country where social polarization is deep, there is a fine line between the demand that ‘corruption must be accounted for’ and the risk of a ‘new political revanchism.’

The accountability process must be conducted not with a thirst for revenge, but through ‘universal principles of law.’

The path to this requires:

• The establishment of special anti-corruption prosecutor’s offices that will not fall under political influence.
• The complete independence of institutions such as the Court of Accounts (Sayıştay) and MASAK.
• The implementation of asset recovery mechanisms that meet international standards.

Systemic Transformation: Facing the Truth Prosecuting individuals is merely a result. True success lies in closing the systemic loopholes — such as arbitrary appointments, opaque tender processes, and the lack of oversight — that created this ‘culture of corruption.’ For Türkiye, this is not just a change in government, but a process of institutions returning to a state of ‘collective reason.’

As we approach 2027, Türkiye’s greatest test is not just economic restoration, but the repair of social trust. Confronting the mistakes of the past should be viewed not as a tool for a rematch, but as a method for democratic cleansing while laying the foundations for the future.

A strong state survives not through its secrets, but through its transparency. The reconstruction of Türkiye will begin precisely on the day that this transparency is established. If the new administration fails to manage this process correctly, it is highly probable that they will not be re-elected in the following election.