My TİP Kocaeli Experience

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Yesterday, I had a meeting with a few people from the Kocaeli Provincial Organization of the Workers' Party of Türkiye (TİP). They welcomed me with great interest and I was happy. They listened to me, asked whether I had any questions I wanted to ask them, and we established a nice dialogue. I had never seen such a nice welcome in any political party before. Although I had previously been a member of the Republican People's Party (CHP), and before that I had no membership in any political party. For this reason, I had no political background either.

When the Republican People's Party was annulled with absolute nullity, I had resigned from the party, and afterwards I had not become a member of any party. Of my own volition, I joined the Workers' Party of Türkiye and became an active member. I joined the Workers' Party of Türkiye (TİP) not to participate in actions in the streets, but to observe the field and to report by shooting videos. In this way, I think I can contribute more to the party. In other words, I think that being a member of a political party is not only about participating in actions, but also that it would be more efficient to benefit the party in other areas where one can provide benefit.

At the Workers' Party of Türkiye Kocaeli Organization, Ms. Özlem welcomed me and took an interest. After a long conversation with her, she gave information about the party and talked about the work they do. In other words, she introduced the party in its true sense. Ms. Özlem was a very kind person with strong communication skills, and while we were chatting, two more gentlemen came and our conversation spread to a wider area, and we began to talk about different fields as well. We had a pleasant conversation and then parted ways.

I read the Bylaws of the Workers' Party of Türkiye and examined the Party Program. I recommend that you examine the Bylaws.

The Gap between embargo rhetoric and reality

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On May 2, 2024, Türkiye announced that it had completely halted all trade relations with Israel. According to official statements, exports, imports, free zone trade, and transit trade were fully suspended, and Turkish-flagged and Israeli-flagged air and sea transportation were banned. However, international trade data, ship tracking systems, and independent research reveal that this embargo has remained largely on paper, with trade continuing through various indirect channels.

There is a massive gap between Türkiye's official data and Israel's official data

While the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) data shows no trade items with Israel after May 2, 2024, according to Trading Economics, which compiles the UN COMTRADE database, Israel's imports from Türkiye in 2025 were recorded at $2.12 billion. This figure places Türkiye as Israel's 10th largest import source, on par with the United Kingdom.

According to data from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), **exports from Türkiye to Israel in 2025 amounted to $924.1 million**. In just the January-February 2026 period, this figure reached $176.1 million.

The top product groups exported from Türkiye to Israel in 2025 were as follows.

The "confidential country" category and the transparency problem

Murat Emir, Deputy Group Chair of the Yeni Party, drew attention to the "Confidential Country" heading in TURKSTAT's foreign trade statistics, opened under the pretext of "commercial secrecy." Noting that this category showed a volume of $2.1 billion for 2025, Emir asked, "Was the export to Israel recorded under this 'confidential country' item?"

The Ministry of Trade, however, denied these claims, asserting that the customs system is completely closed to Israel and that no trade transactions have been registered for 23 months. The Ministry labeled the claims based on Israeli data as "disinformation."

Oil shipments covert flow through Ceyhan Port

One of the most striking contradictions is in oil shipments. Despite Türkiye's embargo decision, Azerbaijani oil continues to be shipped from the Ceyhan terminal to Israel.

According to data compiled by Reuters from ship tracking systems, the amount of Azerbaijani oil sent from Ceyhan to Israel increased by 31% in 2025, reaching 94,000 barrels per day. This was recorded as the highest level in the last three years.

Oil sent from Azerbaijan via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline meets approximately 30% of Israel's oil needs.

The shadow fleet ships disabling signals

International investigations reveal in detail how the embargo is being circumvented. According to research conducted by Middle East Eye in collaboration with the "No Port for Genocide" campaign.

Covert crude oil shipments to Israel between May 2024 and December 2025.

• 57 covert crude oil shipments
• Approximately 47 million barrels of oil
• Shipments were carried out via Türkiye
• Ships disabled their tracking systems (AIS), going into "dark" mode
• Egypt's Port Said was reported as the false destination

Military material shipments.

• 13 military shipments in 2025 (ammunition, machine gun components, defense materials belonging to Elbit Systems)

Coal shipments.

• 8 covert coal shipments between October 2023 and February 2026
• Total of 751,000 tons of South African coal

The role of Greek companies

The majority of covert shipments are carried out by Greek shipping companies. According to the research.

• Companies Thenamaris and Kyklades increased their share of oil shipments after the embargo from approximately 22% to over 91%
• Greek tankers circumvented Türkiye's Israel embargo via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline
• Ships violated international maritime rules by reporting false destinations and disabling tracking systems

The Palestinian route claim

The Ministry of Trade argues that the trade appearing in Israeli records stems from shipments made to the Palestinian Authority. According to the Ministry.

• Since Palestine has no port or customs of its own, shipments are technically made through Israeli ports
• Shipments are carried out with the approval of the Palestinian Ministry of National Economy
• There is approximately $50-60 million in monthly Palestinian trade.

However, Yeni Party's Emir claims that the Israeli statistical office does not include trade with the Palestinian Authority in the standard "Israeli foreign trade" tables, therefore the announced figures directly reflect Türkiye-Israel trade.

The Gap between official statements and industry data

Türkiye's Ministry of Trade maintains that the embargo is being fully implemented.

"Since May 2, 2024, trade with Israel has been zero. The customs system is closed."

However, international data and field research contradict this claim.

Political consequences and contradictory messages

The claims that trade is continuing create a serious credibility problem in Türkiye's foreign policy.

1. While harsh rhetoric against Israel continues in public, the continuation of trade relations behind the scenes causes foreign policy to be perceived as "two-faced."
2. U.S. Ambassador to Ankara Tom Barrack, at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, stated "Türkiye and Israel will not fight each other" implying that a trade agreement between the two countries could be made in the "not-too-distant future."
3. While Türkiye is seeking an Interpol "Red Notice" for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, the continuation of billions of dollars in trade during the same period raises questions about the sincerity of Türkiye's support for the Palestinian cause.

Available data clearly demonstrates a deep chasm between Türkiye's "no trade with Israel" rhetoric and international trade data. Despite official statements.

• UN COMTRADE data shows a $2.12 billion trade volume in 2025
• Israeli official data records $924 million in exports in 2025
• Ship tracking systems confirm that covert oil shipments from Ceyhan port to Israel are continuing
• "Shadow fleet" operations conducted through Greek companies reveal that the embargo is being systematically circumvented
• The appearance of $2.1 billion in TURKSTAT's "Confidential Country" category deepens the transparency problem

This contradiction raises serious questions about the sincerity of Türkiye's support for the Palestinian cause, its foreign policy credibility, and its commitment to international obligations. This chasm between harsh public rhetoric and the trade relations that continue in reality represents a significant test for the future stance and reputation of Turkish foreign policy.

Note: This article is based on publicly available trade data, shipping records, and reporting from various news sources. All figures are cited from their respective sources and are presented for informational purposes.

When the law bends to power Türkiye’s crisis of judicial credibility

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The current state of Türkiye’s judiciary, particularly after the critical turning points of 2010 and 2016, has undergone a profound transformation. While judicial independence is constitutionally guaranteed under Article 138, the practical application of this principle has become one of the most contentious issues in the country’s modern political history. The growing influence of the executive branch over judicial appointments and disciplinary proceedings has led to a widening gap between legal assurances and on-the-ground realities.

The structural transformation of the judiciary

The restructuring of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK) has been a focal point of criticism. Changes in the appointment mechanisms and the composition of the council have raised concerns that the judiciary is increasingly staffed with cadres aligned with the ruling administration. This shift is perceived by many observers as eroding the institutional autonomy of the courts, creating a judiciary that is not only responsive to the executive but also integral to its strategy of consolidating power.

This structural transformation has given rise to what many describe as the "field reality" a widespread perception that legal decisions, especially in politically sensitive cases, are shaped more by anticipated political outcomes than by objective legal evidence. This perception is not limited to political opposition; it is shared by segments of the legal community, academia, and international watchdogs, all of whom have documented instances of due process violations and politically motivated prosecutions.

The polarized interpretation of justice

The most challenging aspect of this debate is its deeply polarized nature. The government maintains that all judicial decisions are made independently and based on concrete evidence, particularly in cases related to terrorism and organized crime. Conversely, opposition groups and civil society organizations contend that these very same cases are often used as instruments to silence dissent and marginalize political rivals.

This polarization means that the same court ruling can be interpreted in completely opposite ways depending on one’s political stance. Such a fragmented understanding of justice undermines the foundational principle that the law should be a neutral arbiter in society, not a weapon to be wielded in partisan conflict.

International perspective and compliance

The domestic controversies have significant international repercussions. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has issued multiple rulings against Türkiye, citing violations of freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial in prominent cases, such as those of Osman Kavala and Ahmet Altan. These rulings highlight an increasing dissonance between Türkiye’s domestic legal practices and its international human rights obligations. Furthermore, the continuous criticism from the Venice Commission and other European bodies underscores the systemic nature of these concerns, placing Türkiye’s judiciary under persistent international scrutiny.

A test of democratic resilience

Türkiye finds itself at a critical juncture. The credibility of its judiciary is not merely a matter of domestic political debate but a crucial factor influencing its international standing and internal stability. The current trajectory marked by executive dominance over judicial appointments, politically charged prosecutions, and international censure poses a fundamental challenge to the rule of law. For Türkiye to navigate this period without long-term damage to its democratic institutions, it will require a genuine and inclusive dialogue among all stakeholders, aimed at rebuilding public trust in the independence, impartiality, and integrity of its judicial system.

Zafer Party Leader Prof. Dr. Ümit Özdağ Warns of Multidimensional Crisis Involving Territorial Integrity, Demographics, Economy, and Social Fabric.

Prof. Dr. Ümit Özdağ, the Chairman of the Zafer Party, in his latest political assessment, has claimed that the Republic of Türkiye is undergoing a process of "slow-motion collapse." According to Özdağ, the country is facing one of the greatest threats in its history, and the most dangerous aspect of this process is the apparent consensus between the ruling party and the opposition on many critical issues.

At the heart of Özdağ's criticism lies the so-called "Framework Law" which he alleges grants amnesty to the PKK terrorist organization, and the subsequent constitutional amendment debates. He argues that these arrangements aim to dismantle the national, unitary, and secular state founded by Atatürk. In its place, he contends, there is an attempt to establish a new, multi-national state model composed of autonomous regions, paving the way for fragmentation. In this context, he criticizes the laws passed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, emphasizing that this process is being carried out "through the Gazi Parliament."

The party leader does not limit his definition of "slow-motion collapse" solely to political regulations. He expands his criticism by highlighting the multidimensional crises facing the country. Foremost among these is the "demographic threat" posed by a foreign-born population exceeding 13 million. Additionally, he draws attention to the deepening economic depression, widespread addiction issues affecting 6 million people (including 4 million drug addicts and 2 million addicted to virtual gambling), and the alarming rate of femicide, where an average of 1.5 women are murdered daily, illustrating the extent of social decay.

Özdağ directs particularly harsh criticism at the economic management, alleging that the government does not hesitate to sell public assets to finance election economics. He cites the sale (privatization) of bridges and highways for 30-year periods through presidential decrees as an example, claiming this practice is essentially an effort to generate funds for the ruling administration.

In the face of all these developments, Ümit Özdağ emphasizes that a solution is only possible through the will of the Turkish nation. He asserts that the Zafer Party, with its understanding of Turkish nationalism in line with Atatürk's principles, represents the sole political will capable of rescuing the country from this multidimensional collapse. He states that they will offer comprehensive solutions in every area, from border security and the justice system to economic prosperity and social peace. 

I was born on the edge of a dusty road, among the yellow grasses swaying in wave after wave of wind.

The steppe of Central Anatolia was not merely a geography; it was a state of mind. My childhood passed across those plains where the horizon stretched like a line, in that feeling of infinity where the sky met the earth. Then I grew up, merged into the crowds of cities, and lost myself among piles of concrete. But the steppe always remained within me as a silent call flowing through my blood until one day, that call turned into a cry.

I remember: summer evenings, those hours when the sun sank like a crimson fireball beyond the horizon. The fields would turn golden yellow, and the scent of thyme carried by the wind would fill my nostrils. My grandfather's hands were calloused, his face carved with the lines of the steppe. With those hands, he would sow seeds as if caressing the parched soil. "This land" he would say, "teaches a person patience. It asks nothing of you; it only knows how to wait for its time." I didn't understand it then, but now I know that the steppe is the purest embodiment of waiting, patience, and labor.

Years passed. I lived in the gray streets of Kocaeli, unaware of how time flowed by. Every day the same rush, every night the same exhaustion. But occasionally, in a breath of wind, in a bird's song, in the steam rising from a glass of tea, I would find something reminiscent of the steppe. Those moments made me feel something stirring in the depths of my heart. As if the steppe were an ancient wisdom calling out to me, and I had long turned a deaf ear to that call. Those deep folk songs about the steppe reminded me of my true self and told me to return to the place I belonged.

Last spring, I set out under the pretext of a business trip. It was just a pretext, really; inside me lay an indescribable longing. As the car moved toward the plains of Central Anatolia, the landscape began to change. I had seen every shade of green, but the steppe's own peculiar yellowish-brown filled me with a warmth that soothed my soul. I turned off the radio and rolled down the window. The wind struck my face the scent of my childhood, the smell of fields, of mud, of dry grass... My eyes welled up.That day, I walked through the fields where I used to run as a child. The bushes by the roadside were still in the same places. Beyond a distant hill stood the ruined house where we had played hide-and-seek as children, where we ran and had fun; it was still there. I touched the soil. What was that feeling like? Warm, dry, rough yet at the same time alive, something that breathed. My grandfather's words came back to me: "This land teaches a person patience." So the steppe had not abandoned me. It was I who had forgotten it.

That night, I sat in a village coffeehouse. The elderly men were playing backgammon, and tea was being brewed. Outside, the stars were brighter and closer than I could ever see in the cities. There was a deep silence but this was not the artificial silence of cities; it was the deep breath of the earth. In that moment, I realized that the steppe was not actually silence, but rather a whisper thousands of years old. That whisper was kneaded with the footprints of Hittites, Phrygians, and Seljuks; every stone, every blade of grass told a story. And I was part of that story.

Now I know: a person is the child of the soil they were born on. No matter how far they wander, the wind will one day bring them back. The steppe gave me not just a place, but a sense of belonging. My desire to return there was not an escape, but an effort to take root. My memories blossomed anew on those parched lands. Just as the steppe suddenly comes to life after spring rains flowers bloom, grasses sprout, butterflies flutter so too were the arid lands within me watered.

The steppe is silent and dignified. It does not speak; but you feel it. Its call is not an invitation, but a reminder: "Do not forget where you came from." And now, I return there at every opportunity. Because that is where my story began. No matter how much concrete is laid, no matter how much time passes, that steppe will always flourish in the depths of my soul. I am a child of the steppe, and my roots continue to sway in the wind, among those yellow grasses.

The Neighbor's Fire

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As of 2026, with U.S. - Iran military tensions continuing to escalate, the Middle East has once again been pushed to the brink of war. As a neighbor sharing a land border of over 550 kilometers with Iran and heavily dependent on Middle Eastern energy corridors, Türkiye though not a direct party to the conflict feels the scorching heat of this "neighbor's fire" acutely. The U.S. - Iran tension not only impacts Türkiye's already fragile economy through energy prices and trade routes but also poses serious challenges to Ankara's national strategies at the security and geopolitical levels.

The economic transmission mechanism from energy prices to the "Bread Basket"

Türkiye is heavily dependent on imported oil and natural gas, making its economy highly sensitive to fluctuations in international energy prices. The threat posed by the U.S. - Iran conflict to shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz immediately triggered anxiety over energy supply within Türkiye. As early as the initial stages of the escalation, Turkish citizens formed long queues at gas stations out of fear of rising fuel prices and subsequent developments proved these concerns to be well-founded.

Looking at macroeconomic data, Treasury and Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek acknowledged that war-induced oil price increases have created "negative" pressure on the economy. According to official assessments, if the average oil price remains around $85 per barrel in 2026, Türkiye's inflation rate is expected to rise by an additional 3.6 to 4.4 percentage points, while economic growth is projected to slow by 0.6 to 1.5 percentage points. Given that annual inflation stood at 31.5% in February 2026, this additional burden is nothing short of pouring more weight onto an already strained system.

This macroeconomic pressure manifests itself in the most tangible and direct way possible through bread. In Turkish culture, "bread money" (ekmek parası) is synonymous with one's livelihood. However, the U.S.-Israel axis of military operations pushed up energy and flour prices, forcing bread prices to rise sharply. In Ankara, for example, the price of a loaf of sourdough bread jumped from 95 lira to 120 lira. After remaining unchanged for eight months, bread prices across the country were raised by nearly 17%. As local economists have pointed out, the effects of war are not a distant abstraction but a concrete reality squeezing every Turkish family's "bread basket."

The security and foreign policy dilemma between mediation, gedging, and precaution

Faced with a conflict on its doorstep, Türkiye's security and foreign policy posture reveals a complex and pragmatic character.

First, active mediation and diplomatic hedging form the core of its strategy. Türkiye has explicitly opposed any military intervention against Iran and has offered to play a mediating role between Washington and Tehran. Turkish foreign ministers have engaged in intensive diplomatic contacts with Iran and other regional actors, even offering to host potential U.S. - Iran talks on Turkish soil. This mediation effort reflects both a genuine desire to preserve regional stability and Türkiye's broader hedging strategy of balancing between East and West while enhancing its geopolitical influence.

Second, preventing a refugee influx and securing the border constitute Türkiye's most pressing concern. Having already experienced the massive refugee wave from the Syrian civil war, Türkiye is acutely aware of the socio-economic burden that a new wave from Iran could impose. Accordingly, Turkish officials have stated that they are "prepared to strengthen border security measures with Iran" including the construction of physical barriers if necessary. At the same time, Ankara has firmly denied allegations of "plans to invade Iranian territory," emphasizing its respect for its neighbor's sovereignty.

Finally, the Kurdish question has resurfaced as a critical strategic concern. Türkiye fears that Kurdish groups in Iran could capitalize on regional instability to grow stronger, potentially energizing separatist movements among Kurdish populations in Iraq, Syria, and within Türkiye itself. This is precisely why Ankara is eager to see the conflict de-escalate and end quickly, rather than drag on or expand.

In summary, the U.S. - Iran military conflict represents a "neighbor's fire with no winners" for Türkiye. Economically, it strikes at the country's fragile macroeconomic foundation through energy price shocks, directly raising the cost of living for ordinary citizens. In security terms, it brings direct threats ranging from potential refugee flows to the spillover of Kurdish-related instability. For these reasons, Türkiye is simultaneously pursuing a mediating role to lower tensions while reinforcing its border defenses to protect its own interests. The future trajectory of this conflict will continue to profoundly shape Türkiye's domestic and foreign policy in the period ahead.

State institution culture and aesthetic understanding

Atatürk's vision was not confined to constitutions and laws; it permeated every corner of Türkiye from a village institute in a remote province to a government mansion in a district, and from factory workers' housing in a city to a rural schoolyard. As you rightly pointed out, wherever you go in Türkiye, there is a common language extending from a state institution's parking lot to the arrangement of trees in its garden, from the façade of the building to the lighting in its corridors. This was no coincidence, but the product of a conscious construction process.

Architectural and public space understanding the physical signature of the Republic

In contrast to the ornate and complex architectural style inherited from the Ottomans, Republican-era architecture was built on the principles of simplicity, functionality, and symmetry. Behind this understanding lay the idea that the state should be transparent, accessible, and orderly. Government mansions, schools, hospitals, and community centers (Halkevleri) from that period were generally two or three stories high, with flat roofs, wide eaves, and rectangular forms.

• Standardization: The architectural plans for these buildings were often prepared centrally and sent to all corners of the country. Thus, a school in Edirne shared the same architectural language as a school in Van.
• Gardens and Landscaping: Institution gardens typically featured lawns, symmetrically planted pine trees, and modest yet well-maintained walking paths. Right next to the main entrance gates, small guard huts or lodgings made of the same materials and design were placed.
• Parking Lots: Under the conditions of the time, parking lots were not the vast expanses we see today; they were neat, tree-lined areas paved with stone or interlocking pavers, accommodating just a few vehicles. This was part of the institution's overall ethos of "order."

Building belonging and the modern citizen

This spatial standardization, on one hand, conveyed the state's authority and solemnity, while on the other, it delivered a clear message to the citizen: "This state is the same everywhere, reliable, and modern." A child growing up in a remote corner of Anatolia, upon visiting the government mansion in the nearest town for the first time, would encounter a structure similar to the school in their own village, thus feeling the state's presence and continuity in a tangible way.

This was also part of the project to create a "modern citizen." The Turkish flag in front of institution buildings, the bust of Atatürk, and the inscriptions on the walls such as "Happy is the one who says I am a Turk" transformed these spaces from mere schools or hospitals into centers of culture and identity production.

The psychological effect of institutional identity balancing trust and awe

The feelings of a citizen entering a state institution in that era were mixed. On one hand, there was the state's compassionate wing (hospitals, schools, community centers); on the other, the state's deterrent power (gendarmerie stations, courthouses). Yet in both cases, the physical language of the space reflected the same seriousness and order.

Institutional Culture: The dress codes of civil servants working in these buildings (suits, ties, official caps), their style of speech, and their behavior patterns created an institutional culture that was integrated with the physical space.

Urban Landmark: These buildings were often the most impressive and well-maintained structures in their respective cities or districts. This was perceived as a physical indicator of the importance the state attached to that region.

The reflection of this vision today

Unfortunately, in the post-1980 period, rapid urbanization and privatization policies have largely disrupted this aesthetic integrity. Old institution gardens have been turned into parking lots, and symmetrically planted pine trees have given way to concrete blocks. New government buildings, for the most part, have become soulless glass and concrete structures devoid of functionality.

However, even today, when you see an old community center or a government mansion from that era in some Anatolian town, you can still feel that atmosphere. Because these buildings are not just structures; they are the petrified embodiments of the Republic's founding philosophy, its hope, and its ideal of modernization.

Atatürk's vision permeated not only factories and banks but also the pine trees in the gardens of those factories, the lighting in school corridors, and the flagpoles at the entrances of government mansions. This invisible network served as a powerful tool that bound Türkiye together as a unified "state and nation" reminding everyone of the Republic every single day. The reason we fondly recall that atmosphere today is perhaps because, in that era, stone, soil, and wood all carried an ideal.

With the proclamation of the Republic, Türkiye faced the historic task of complementing its political independence with economic sovereignty. The legacy inherited from the Ottoman Empire consisted of heavy foreign debt, capitulations, an exhausted treasury, and an agricultural economy with almost no industrial infrastructure. Under these conditions, the development drive initiated under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was not merely an industrialization project, but the concrete embodiment of the ideal of building a fully independent state.

The İzmir economics congress (1923) the national pact of economic independence

Even before the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, the İzmir Economics Congress, held between February 17 and March 4, 1923, represented the first major declaration of the new Türkiye's economic direction. The decisions taken at the congress, while encouraging the private sector, also paved the way for the state to play an active role in industrialization. Atatürk's words at the congress perfectly summarize the entire endeavor.

"However great political and military victories may be, unless they are crowned by economic victories, the victories won cannot be lasting."

This congress was the first herald of Atatürk's vision of a "national economy."

The principle of statism why state-led industry?

The devastation caused by the 1929 World Economic Depression and the private sector's lack of sufficient capital accumulation pushed the state directly into the role of investor. The principle of Statism adopted in the 1930s envisaged the state engaging in production in areas where the private sector either could not enter or was insufficient. However, this was not an application against private enterprise; on the contrary, it was a necessity to build the infrastructure that would create national industry.

Sümerbank the heart of industry and the hub of development

The most remarkable institution of this period was Sümerbank, established on July 11, 1933. Sümerbank was more than just a bank; with its factories spread across the four corners of Türkiye, it was essentially an industrial holding company. Aiming to produce everything from cotton to cloth, and from wool to blankets using domestic resources, Sümerbank carried out major investments that are still talked about today.

1. Kayseri Cloth Factory (1935): Türkiye's first large-scale textile complex.
2. Nazilli Print Factory (1937): Inaugurated by Atatürk himself, this factory played a key role in the development of the Aegean Region.
3. Bursa Merinos Factory (1938): One of the last factories opened by Atatürk, Merinos also laid the foundation of Türkiye's woolen industry.

Sümerbank also transformed the social fabric of Anatolia with the schools, dispensaries, and social facilities it established around its factories.

SEKA (cellulose and paper factories) the nationalization of paper

Initiating paper production in Türkiye was one of the Republic's most strategic moves. SEKA, whose foundations were laid in İzmit in 1936 and which began production in 1939, was established to meet this need. Türkiye, which had previously imported paper, reduced its foreign dependency in this area with SEKA. Pioneering the training of engineers like Mehmet Ali Kağıtçı, SEKA also became a center of social life in the city where it was located, housing facilities such as a cinema, a sports club, and a community center.

Banks and infrastructure institutions

 The industrial drive was not just about factories. Institutions to finance these investments and to process energy and mineral resources were also established one after another.

• Etibank (1935): Established to operate mineral deposits and organize energy production.
• Electrical Works Survey Administration (1935): Laid the groundwork for energy infrastructure by planning the country's electricity potential.
• State Airlines (1933): The first step in modernization of transportation.

Why was this drive "revolutionary"?

The institutions established during the Atatürk era served directly the goal of a "national economy." Previously, Anatolia largely exported raw materials and imported processed products from abroad. With these facilities.

• High value-added products began to be produced domestically.
• Efforts were made to curb unemployment.
• The domestic market was revitalized.
• Foreign dependency was reduced.

All these moves were products of the belief, as Atatürk emphasized in 1923, that political liberation must be reinforced with economic liberation.

The changing world order and the reflection of the legacy today

Unfortunately, starting from the 1980s, within the framework of neoliberal economic policies that came to dominate the world, institutions like Sümerbank, SEKA, and Etibank were downsized or closed down through privatization. For example, SEKA effectively ended in 2005, and Sümerbank in 2002. However, the greatest legacy these institutions left behind was ensuring that the industry had a certain accumulation of knowledge and a culture of the working class.

Today, the foundations of Türkiye's success in areas ranging from automotive to defense industry lie in the modest but determined steps taken in that era.

The industrial drive of the Atatürk era was not merely a development strategy, but also the economic reflection of the Republic's philosophy of independence. Factories, banks, and institutions were the building blocks of the ideal of building an independent, strong, and dignified society. Whatever the fate of these institutions in the historical process, the path they opened will remain in memory as a turning point in Türkiye's industrialization journey.

An analysis of Osman Nuri Koçtürk's "Gıda Emperyalizmi"

In an era where global food prices fluctuate wildly and supply chains are weaponized, the insights of Turkish scientist Osman Nuri Koçtürk remain remarkably prescient. Writing in 1966 and republished in 2009 by the Turkish Chamber of Agricultural Engineers Koçtürk laid bare a chilling reality: food has become the most effective weapon of modern imperialism. His analysis, grounded in decades of scientific observation and personal experience, reveals how developed nations have replaced military occupation with economic manipulation through agricultural policy.

The book opens with a stark observation that resonates even more powerfully today: "Countries are managed through oil, but people are managed through food." This fundamental premise drives Koçtürk's exploration of what he terms "Food Imperialism" the systematic use of food aid, agricultural surpluses, and trade policies to create dependency and extract wealth from developing nations.

The Mechanism of Food Imperialism

Koçtürk's central thesis rests on a simple biological truth: human labor and intellectual capacity depend entirely on adequate nutrition. By controlling a nation's food supply, imperial powers can control its workforce, its health, its educational outcomes, and ultimately its political will.

The author identifies four essential factors of production Man, Money, Materials, and Machinery which American economists summarized as the "4M" formula. While traditional colonialism seized territory through military force, the new colonialism focuses on controlling these four elements, particularly the human element, through economic means.

Perhaps the most striking illustration in the book is Koçtürk's "mouse cage" metaphor: when 40 mice are confined with precisely enough food for 40, they reproduce peacefully. But as the population grows while food remains constant, the colony descends into chaos fighting, cannibalism, and social breakdown. When the population drops back to 40, peace returns. This, Koçtürk argues, is precisely what happens to developing nations whose food supplies are artificially constrained or manipulated.

The Turkish case study: a three-act play

Koçtürk dedicates significant attention to Türkiye's experience, presenting it as a textbook example of food imperialism in action, staged in three distinct acts.

Act one: the meat and milk game

Türkiye once had a robust livestock sector. To dismantle it, imperial powers flooded the market with subsidized powdered milk and frozen poultry at prices below local production costs. Domestic producers were bankrupted, and Turkish citizens gradually shifted from animal protein to a grain-based diet. The result: a population physically weaker and more dependent on imported staples.

Act two: the wheat game

Before World War II, Türkiye was a wheat exporter. Through the US Public Law 480 program, subsidized American wheat was poured into the Turkish market. While this initially appeared as generous aid, its true purpose was to undercut Turkish farmers, who abandoned wheat cultivation for more profitable cash crops like tobacco, cotton, and sugar beets. Within a decade, Türkiye once a breadbasket had become one of the world's largest wheat importers.

Act three: the oil game

Türkiye produces some of the world's finest olive oil. Yet American soybean interests, unable to sell their surplus domestically or in Europe, targeted Türkiye as a new market. Initially, they offered high prices for Turkish olive oil while simultaneously flooding the country with cheap soybean oil. The population was gradually weaned off olive oil and onto margarine. Once this dependency was established, the imperial powers reversed course: they stopped buying Turkish olive oil, drove down its price, and demanded dollars for the soybean oil they had previously offered cheaply. The Turkish government was forced to cancel the agreement, but the damage to the domestic olive oil industry and public health was severe.

The public health consequences

Koçtürk presciently connected these economic manipulations to devastating health outcomes. As margarine consumption rose, so did cardiovascular disease. He cites official Turkish statistics showing a steady increase in heart-related deaths throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. While US scientists and policymakers publicly acknowledged the health risks of hydrogenated oils, their Turkish counterparts influenced by commercial interests actively suppressed this information.

The author does not limit his critique to Western powers. He notes that Eastern bloc nations employ similar tactics, offering vodka factories and cultural exchanges as entry points before establishing economic dependency. The choice between East and West, he warns, is a false one for developing nations.

Disturbing Confessions

Perhaps the most powerful section of Koçtürk's work is his documentation of Western policymakers' frank admissions about food's strategic role. He quotes Don Paarlberg, the first coordinator of the PL 480 food aid program, who stated: "Food given as foreign aid destroys the agricultural markets of recipient countries and discourages their producers. The people of these nations have become victims of 'Food Imperialism.'"

Even more chillingly, Texas Senator Wright Patman declared: "Of all the weapons ever used in international warfare, food is the most effective. The United States possesses this weapon and will maintain its superiority in using it longer than any other nation."

Koçtürk also documents the proposal of Dr. Joseph Goldzieher, who suggested adding sterilizing agents to the public water supply of developing nations to control population growth a proposal that, while rejected, demonstrates the extreme lengths to which imperial thinking can extend.

Solutions and Path Forward

Koçtürk does not simply diagnose the problem; he offers a prescription for liberation. His recommendations are remarkably clear.

1. National Awareness: The first step is public education about food imperialism and its mechanisms. Democracy requires an informed citizenry that can resist manipulation.
2. Food Self-Sufficiency: Developing nations must prioritize agricultural development that meets domestic nutritional needs before pursuing industrial expansion. Without food independence, all other forms of development remain vulnerable.
3. Cultural Defense: Food is not merely fuel; it is an expression of cultural identity. The replacement of traditional foods with imported alternatives is a form of cultural colonization that must be resisted.
4. Strategic Vigilance: Governments must establish rigorous inspection regimes for all imported food, recognizing that contamination whether chemical, biological, or ideological poses a national security threat.
5. Careful Foreign Relations: Neither Western nor Eastern powers offer genuine partnership to developing nations. True independence lies in self-reliance and strategic neutrality.

Contemporary Relevance

Koçtürk's analysis, written during the Cold War, seems almost prophetic in its relevance to today's global food system. The consolidation of global grain markets among a handful of multinational corporations, the use of food aid as a lever for political influence, and the devastating impact of price volatility on food-importing developing nations all confirm his central thesis.

The recent resurgence of "food sovereignty" movements demanding that nations control their own food production represents the kind of resistance Koçtürk advocated. Similarly, growing awareness of how processed foods, particularly seed oils, affect public health echoes his warnings about margarine.

Osman Nuri Koçtürk was a veterinarian and biochemist who understood that nutrition is not merely a biological necessity but a political question of profound importance. His work demonstrates that food independence is not a luxury for developing nations but a prerequisite for genuine sovereignty.

In a world where supply chain disruptions become weapons and where the right to adequate nutrition remains unmet for billions, Koçtürk's message transcends its original context. His call for public awareness, self-reliance, and resistance to economic manipulation remains as urgent today as it was in 1966. The new colonialism, it appears, operates not through armies and battleships, but through the subtle control of what we eat and what we cannot grow ourselves.

"Man is a biological creature as much as he is a social one. Without adequate food, no society can develop, and without food independence, no nation can truly be free."
— Osman Nuri Koçtürk

I had conversations over tea with great people who are older than me.

Photo Mehmet Teke on Pexels

On August 29, 2026, we met up with MR. Nihat, a retired soldier, and MR. Tuğrul, a retired teacher, for a pleasant conversation. Over sips of tea, we discussed Türkiye's structural problems and possible solutions.

Having been a soldier, MR. Nihat had the opportunity to serve in various parts of Türkiye and is quite familiar with the country's diverse human cultures. MR. Tuğrul, as a former teacher, has educated thousands of students across many regions of Türkiye and is an experienced educator who has been immersed in different cultures.

MR. Nihat conducts research on philosophy and Turkic languages, and is also writing a thesis on a particular subject. On this occasion, he shared some of his research with me. He is a highly accomplished, very kind, and intellectual individual, shaped by the Republic's educational system. He is a remarkably knowledgeable and highly skilled person. Likewise, MR. Tuğrul is one of the enlightened individuals shaped by the Republic. His former students have gone on to carry out internationally recognized work and have represented Türkiye abroad. For a teacher, this is a tremendous source of pride and honor. On behalf of my country, meeting such valuable people and exchanging ideas with them made me very happy. I once again saw that we need enlightened and intellectual individuals to overcome this dark period Türkiye is going through. We are facing a government that is dragging Türkiye into the quagmire of the Middle East, shaking the fundamental values of the Republic, and disregarding our core values. This government is doing great harm to our country and spending the money of future generations on interest lobbies.

Turkish society needs to be analyzed carefully. The greatest weakness of our society has been 'religion' and politicians have managed to bring certain segments under their influence by engaging in religious peddling. However, it would be very wrong to say that these politicians are pious; they merely use religion as a tool.

The wrongdoings of the government and the deep economic poverty into which it has plunged our country have sparked a awakening of consciousness in society, and the public has now begun to think. Societies that think and question do not become puppets of politicians, because they constantly research and scrutinize what is being done. Under normal circumstances, the general elections planned for 2028 will likely be held in 2027, because the government needs an early election; otherwise, the current President cannot run for reelection. In the general election, which seems likely to take place in 2027, society will make its decision, but this time I believe the public will deal a heavy blow to the government. Because in the previous local elections, society enabled the main opposition party to win many municipalities that had been held by the ruling party, sending a strong message to the government. However, the ruling party, using state power, carried out dawn raids on the mayors elected by the people, forcibly taking them from their homes by police and arresting them after the detention process.

In the history of the Republic of Türkiye, there have been many poor administrations, but never before has there been a government that has wielded state power so recklessly.

Society is remaining silent for now, but when the ballot boxes are set up in the general election, the test for the government will begin. Society will give the government a great lesson and will authorize a new administration to make them pay for what they have done. I believe that the biggest corruption trials in the history of the Republic of Türkiye will be seen, because the government has become entangled in corruption on an incredible scale and has stolen the state's money. I believe that these deeds must not go unpunished and that one day the price must certainly be paid, because society harbors a tremendous anger toward the current government and demands that they be brought to justice.

Knowing that it cannot win the general election under the current circumstances, the ruling government has tried to reduce the opposition's vote share by splitting its votes, but it has not succeeded, because society will give its vote to the party most likely to defeat the government. The '50+1' electoral system currently in place in Türkiye will likely be changed again by the hands of the current government, because under these conditions it does not seem likely to receive 50% of the votes.

Anyway, to return to where we started, MR. Nihat and MR. Tuğrul gave me a new vision and sparked new ideas in my mind. I have gained new perspectives for our program called 'Körfez Masası' (Table of the Körfez), which we broadcast on YouTube, and I have already started working on new projects. I will announce my new projects as soon as possible. So far, we have shot four episodes, and we will soon be with you with Episode 5. Türkiye needs enlightened people more than ever, and this society will never forgive those who are hostile to it.

The significant decline in pension amounts in Türkiye compared to the past is not a coincidence or merely a current inflation problem. This situation is the direct mathematical consequence of systematic legal changes made to the social security system in 1999 and especially in 2008 to balance public finances.

Three fundamental structural changes lie behind the current economic picture and the policies implemented.

Climate Change, the Rising Value of Wheat, and Agricultural Policies in Türkiye

Photo Mete Kaan Özdilek on Pexels

Wheat has been an indispensable part of our tables and one of the fundamental building blocks of civilizations throughout human history. Especially in lands like Türkiye, historically the cradle of agriculture, the importance of wheat is not only economic but also cultural and strategic. Anatolian lands, with their fertile nature, have grown wheat abundantly for centuries and met not only their own needs but also those of surrounding geographies.

Today, however, alongside global threats like climate change and water scarcity shaking the world, wrong directions in agricultural policies specific to our country have put wheat production into a serious bottleneck. Recent studies show that climate change could triple global wheat prices, and for Türkiye, this is not just a price increase but also a food security and development issue.

The Strategic Importance of Wheat and the Impact of Climate Change

A recent study published in the journal Earth's Future reveals that if the global temperature increase reaches 3 degrees, wheat prices could reach three times their average level in the 2010s. This frightening picture shows that 74% of the fluctuations in global wheat prices are linked to severe water scarcity. Wheat is highly sensitive to simultaneous drought events.

Climate models predict that with rising global temperatures, wheat farming areas experiencing water scarcity will expand. It is warned that by the end of the century, if adequate measures are not taken, nearly 60% of current planting areas could face the risk of severe water scarcity.

Decreasing Wheat Production in Türkiye and Policy Errors

While the global wheat supply is under the threat of the climate crisis, it is essential for Türkiye to protect and increase its own production. Unfortunately, with the general decline of agriculture in Türkiye, wheat production is also on a downward trend. This situation cannot be explained solely as a consequence of climate; it is also a direct reflection of the wrong agricultural policies implemented.

Policies implemented for years have alienated the farmer from their land and caused input costs (fertilizer, diesel, seeds) to become unbearable. Import-based approaches have left the domestic producer unprotected and wasted the potential of Anatolia's fertile lands. The inadequacy of the government's agricultural support policies and unplanned production models have damaged Türkiye's status as a self-sufficient agricultural country.

Increasing Production and Development

A decrease in wheat production does not merely mean an increase in bread prices. It also means the weakening of agriculture-based industry, the deepening of poverty in rural areas, and an increase in the country's foreign dependency.

However, Türkiye's climate conditions and soil structure, when supported by the right policies, are suitable for highly efficient wheat production. Increasing wheat production is a critical step for raising agricultural output, ensuring rural development, and ultimately strengthening the national economy. A Türkiye that produces its own wheat, and even exports the surplus, will have both ensured its food security and strengthened its hand in international markets.

In this period when the climate crisis is at the door, Türkiye needs to urgently review its agricultural policies and take sustainable and supportive steps that put the domestic producer at the center. Because wheat is not just a plant; it is the cornerstone of the country's development.

Turkish politics has recently been shaken by a rare earthquake. The historic fracture within the Republican People's Party (CHP), which has maintained its position as the main opposition for over two decades, has virtually redrawn the political map. The "New Party" (Yeni Parti), founded by Özgür Özel after he was ousted from the CHP leadership, has quickly become the second-largest power in parliament, causing a reshuffling of the cards in the race for power. So, does this new political entity have the potential to end President Erdoğan's grip on power that has lasted for over two decades?

The Historic Rift in the CHP and the Birth of the New Party

To understand the process, we need to look at the recent past. Taking over the leadership of the CHP in 2023, Özgür Özel brought a breeze of renewal to the party, and this synergy enabled the CHP to surpass the ruling AK Party and become the leading party in the March 2024 local elections for the first time in 22 years. Retaining and winning many metropolitan cities, especially Istanbul, had allowed hopes to blossom on the opposition front.

However, Özel's removal from the chairmanship by a court decision in May and the reinstatement of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu—who had led the party to many defeats in the past—broke the camel's back. Following this process, which many independent observers and human rights organizations interpreted as the "weaponization of the justice system" Özel charted his own path and founded the "New Party" on July 24th.

Splitting parties is not a new phenomenon in Turkish politics. But what made this split historic was its sheer scale. Following Özgür Özel's call, 90 of the CHP's 135 MPs defected to the New Party. While the CHP shrank to the fifth-largest party in parliament with 44 seats, the New Party suddenly took the main opposition seat. Moreover, the fact that Ekrem İmamoğlu—the popular political figure who declared his second victory in Istanbul in 2024 and is currently in the crosshairs of a political ban due to ongoing lawsuits—left his 17-year CHP past behind to join the New Party completely changed the political balance. Polls show the CHP's vote share plummeting below 5%, while the New Party has soared above 30%, making it the AK Party's most serious rival.

Political Balances and 2028 Scenarios

Technically, President Erdoğan's current term expires in 2028, and according to the constitution, parliament must call an early election for him to run again. Many experts expect exactly this to happen. In a potential election, the main factor determining the New Party's chances will be its ability to build a broad "coalition."

At first glance, a divided opposition might seem to benefit the ruling party. For the New Party to overcome this disadvantage, it must go beyond the secular and social democratic base it inherited from the CHP. It needs to establish a wider alliance bloc that encompasses the center-right, nationalists, and Kurdish voters. However, the government's potential reintroduction of a peace process with the PKK carries the risk of detaching actors like the DEM Party from the opposition bloc and further fragmenting it. This situation will be one of the biggest political tests ahead for the New Party.

The Economic Picture and Historical Repetition

In the shadow of political turmoil, the Turkish economy is also facing a tough test. The Central Bank raising its year-end inflation target from 16% to 24%, the sharp 6% drop in the stock market following Özgür Özel's removal from the CHP leadership, and the Turkish Lira's continued slide against the dollar are all factors weakening the government's hand. Judicial crackdowns spooking investors and this fragility in the economy create a significant advantage for the opposition.

On the other hand, it is also possible to draw a historical parallel. The Democrat Party, which broke away from the CHP in 1946, marched to power just four years later, in 1950. The leadership profile of Özgür Özel, who revived the opposition after the disappointment of 2023, could provide the momentum the New Party needs to repeat this history.

A Judicial Vise or a March to Power?

The rise of the New Party has inevitably entered the radar of both the government and the judiciary. The preparation of a summary of proceedings against Özgür Özel on bribery allegations and the request to lift his parliamentary immunity just two weeks after his party's establishment are harbingers of the storm on the horizon.

However, political history shows that pressure and crackdowns do not always yield the desired results. President Erdoğan's own political adventure did not end with the prison sentence he received while serving as the Mayor of Istanbul in the 1990s; on the contrary, it carried him to the Prime Ministry in 2003 and a twenty-year rule thereafter.

If the New Party can withstand the judicial and political pressures, gather the divided opposition under a broad umbrella, and correctly channel the social reaction created by the economic crisis, a potential early election in the coming years could set the stage for a change of hands after a two-decade-long rule.

Contemporary Türkiye is currently navigating one of the most critical junctures in its republican history. The prolonged convergence of political and economic crises renders the sociological metaphor of the "final exit before the bridge" increasingly salient. While the Justice and Development Party (AKP) administration's two-decade tenure initially garnered public support through paradigms of economic growth and institutional reform, the policy trajectories ultimately adopted have driven the nation into a profound systemic impasse.

Photo Craig Adderley on Pexels

Macroeconomic unorthodoxy and deep poverty

A primary locus of criticism regarding the incumbent government involves its departure from rational macroeconomic principles. The persistent application of unorthodox economic theses fundamentally incongruent with universal economic science—most notably the assertion that "interest rates are the cause and inflation is the result"—has precipitated a historic depreciation of the Turkish Lira (₺). Consequently, Türkiye is currently experiencing not merely chronic inflation, but a severe structural reality of deep poverty.

Amidst the erosion of the middle class and a precipitous decline in purchasing power, fundamental necessities such as adequate housing and nutrition have been relegated to the status of luxury. As lower-income demographics struggle for basic subsistence, income inequality has widened to unprecedented levels within the republic's history.

Democratic erosion and the rule of law

This economic degradation is not an incidental byproduct; rather, it is a direct manifestation of institutional decay and democratic backsliding. The de facto eradication of the separation of powers and the centralization of authority under the Presidential Government System have effectively dismantled systemic checks and balances.

Within this trajectory, freedom of the press has sustained the most severe damage. Independent journalists endeavoring to inform the public regarding governmental missteps, corruption allegations, or the true magnitude of the economic crisis face systematic suppression through detentions, incarcerations, and censorship legislation. The press's normative function as the Fourth Estate has been largely supplanted by a governmental echo chamber. The systemic conflation of journalistic activity with ambiguous legal charges—such as "terrorism" or "inciting public hatred and enmity"—has emerged as the most coercive instrument suppressing freedom of expression.

The judicialization of politics and interference with the electorate's will

Free elections and a fair competitive environment, the foundational prerequisites of any democratic system, have been severely compromised by the politicization of the judiciary. The administration's concerted efforts to neutralize its most formidable political adversaries via judicial mechanisms—in order to mitigate the risk of electoral defeat—constitute a profound regression in the nation's political history.

The strategic deployment of unfounded indictments, political bans, and direct penal sentences to sideline opposition leaders and municipal mayors who possess significant public backing and the electoral potential to challenge President Erdoğan represents an intervention not merely against these individuals, but against the democratic will of millions of voters. The instrumentalization of the judiciary to eliminate political competition serves as the most explicit indicator of Türkiye's profound detachment from universal legal norms.

Türkiye is compelled to break free from this self-perpetuating cycle of economic devastation, systemic lawlessness, and authoritarianism. The accumulating societal grievances and the demand for change across diverse demographic strata indicate an urgent imperative to return to the nation's democratic foundations. Achieving economic prosperity is inherently unfeasible within a paradigm where the rule of law is absent, press freedom is curtailed, and political competitors are coerced with incarceration. The impending epoch constitutes the "final exit"—a critical threshold where Türkiye will either recalibrate its trajectory toward contemporary democracy or descend further into this authoritarian tunnel.

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