The constructed face of the Republic

State institution culture and aesthetic understanding



Atatürk's vision was not confined to constitutions and laws; it permeated every corner of Türkiye from a village institute in a remote province to a government mansion in a district, and from factory workers' housing in a city to a rural schoolyard. As you rightly pointed out, wherever you go in Türkiye, there is a common language extending from a state institution's parking lot to the arrangement of trees in its garden, from the façade of the building to the lighting in its corridors. This was no coincidence, but the product of a conscious construction process.

Architectural and public space understanding the physical signature of the Republic

In contrast to the ornate and complex architectural style inherited from the Ottomans, Republican-era architecture was built on the principles of simplicity, functionality, and symmetry. Behind this understanding lay the idea that the state should be transparent, accessible, and orderly. Government mansions, schools, hospitals, and community centers (Halkevleri) from that period were generally two or three stories high, with flat roofs, wide eaves, and rectangular forms.

  • Standardization: The architectural plans for these buildings were often prepared centrally and sent to all corners of the country. Thus, a school in Edirne shared the same architectural language as a school in Van.
  • Gardens and Landscaping: Institution gardens typically featured lawns, symmetrically planted pine trees, and modest yet well-maintained walking paths. Right next to the main entrance gates, small guard huts or lodgings made of the same materials and design were placed.
  • Parking Lots: Under the conditions of the time, parking lots were not the vast expanses we see today; they were neat, tree-lined areas paved with stone or interlocking pavers, accommodating just a few vehicles. This was part of the institution's overall ethos of "order."

Building belonging and the modern citizen

This spatial standardization, on one hand, conveyed the state's authority and solemnity, while on the other, it delivered a clear message to the citizen: "This state is the same everywhere, reliable, and modern." A child growing up in a remote corner of Anatolia, upon visiting the government mansion in the nearest town for the first time, would encounter a structure similar to the school in their own village, thus feeling the state's presence and continuity in a tangible way.

This was also part of the project to create a "modern citizen." The Turkish flag in front of institution buildings, the bust of Atatürk, and the inscriptions on the walls such as "Happy is the one who says I am a Turk" transformed these spaces from mere schools or hospitals into centers of culture and identity production.

The psychological effect of institutional identity balancing trust and awe

The feelings of a citizen entering a state institution in that era were mixed. On one hand, there was the state's compassionate wing (hospitals, schools, community centers); on the other, the state's deterrent power (gendarmerie stations, courthouses). Yet in both cases, the physical language of the space reflected the same seriousness and order.

Institutional Culture: The dress codes of civil servants working in these buildings (suits, ties, official caps), their style of speech, and their behavior patterns created an institutional culture that was integrated with the physical space.

Urban Landmark: These buildings were often the most impressive and well-maintained structures in their respective cities or districts. This was perceived as a physical indicator of the importance the state attached to that region.

The reflection of this vision today

Unfortunately, in the post-1980 period, rapid urbanization and privatization policies have largely disrupted this aesthetic integrity. Old institution gardens have been turned into parking lots, and symmetrically planted pine trees have given way to concrete blocks. New government buildings, for the most part, have become soulless glass and concrete structures devoid of functionality.

However, even today, when you see an old community center or a government mansion from that era in some Anatolian town, you can still feel that atmosphere. Because these buildings are not just structures; they are the petrified embodiments of the Republic's founding philosophy, its hope, and its ideal of modernization.

Atatürk's vision permeated not only factories and banks but also the pine trees in the gardens of those factories, the lighting in school corridors, and the flagpoles at the entrances of government mansions. This invisible network served as a powerful tool that bound Türkiye together as a unified "state and nation" reminding everyone of the Republic every single day. The reason we fondly recall that atmosphere today is perhaps because, in that era, stone, soil, and wood all carried an ideal.

The struggle for economic independence the industrial leap and statism in the Atatürk era



With the proclamation of the Republic, Türkiye faced the historic task of complementing its political independence with economic sovereignty. The legacy inherited from the Ottoman Empire consisted of heavy foreign debt, capitulations, an exhausted treasury, and an agricultural economy with almost no industrial infrastructure. Under these conditions, the development drive initiated under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was not merely an industrialization project, but the concrete embodiment of the ideal of building a fully independent state.

The İzmir economics congress (1923) the national pact of economic independence

Even before the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, the İzmir Economics Congress, held between February 17 and March 4, 1923, represented the first major declaration of the new Türkiye's economic direction. The decisions taken at the congress, while encouraging the private sector, also paved the way for the state to play an active role in industrialization. Atatürk's words at the congress perfectly summarize the entire endeavor.

"However great political and military victories may be, unless they are crowned by economic victories, the victories won cannot be lasting."

This congress was the first herald of Atatürk's vision of a "national economy."

The principle of statism why state-led industry?

The devastation caused by the 1929 World Economic Depression and the private sector's lack of sufficient capital accumulation pushed the state directly into the role of investor. The principle of Statism adopted in the 1930s envisaged the state engaging in production in areas where the private sector either could not enter or was insufficient. However, this was not an application against private enterprise; on the contrary, it was a necessity to build the infrastructure that would create national industry.

Sümerbank the heart of industry and the hub of development

The most remarkable institution of this period was Sümerbank, established on July 11, 1933. Sümerbank was more than just a bank; with its factories spread across the four corners of Türkiye, it was essentially an industrial holding company. Aiming to produce everything from cotton to cloth, and from wool to blankets using domestic resources, Sümerbank carried out major investments that are still talked about today.

  1. Kayseri Cloth Factory (1935): Türkiye's first large-scale textile complex.
  2. Nazilli Print Factory (1937): Inaugurated by Atatürk himself, this factory played a key role in the development of the Aegean Region.
  3. Bursa Merinos Factory (1938): One of the last factories opened by Atatürk, Merinos also laid the foundation of Türkiye's woolen industry.

Sümerbank also transformed the social fabric of Anatolia with the schools, dispensaries, and social facilities it established around its factories.

SEKA (cellulose and paper factories) the nationalization of paper

Initiating paper production in Türkiye was one of the Republic's most strategic moves. SEKA, whose foundations were laid in İzmit in 1936 and which began production in 1939, was established to meet this need. Türkiye, which had previously imported paper, reduced its foreign dependency in this area with SEKA. Pioneering the training of engineers like Mehmet Ali Kağıtçı, SEKA also became a center of social life in the city where it was located, housing facilities such as a cinema, a sports club, and a community center.

Banks and infrastructure institutions

 The industrial drive was not just about factories. Institutions to finance these investments and to process energy and mineral resources were also established one after another.

  • Etibank (1935): Established to operate mineral deposits and organize energy production.
  • Electrical Works Survey Administration (1935): Laid the groundwork for energy infrastructure by planning the country's electricity potential.
  • State Airlines (1933): The first step in modernization of transportation.

Why was this drive "revolutionary"?

The institutions established during the Atatürk era served directly the goal of a "national economy." Previously, Anatolia largely exported raw materials and imported processed products from abroad. With these facilities.

  • High value-added products began to be produced domestically.
  • Efforts were made to curb unemployment.
  • The domestic market was revitalized.
  • Foreign dependency was reduced.

All these moves were products of the belief, as Atatürk emphasized in 1923, that political liberation must be reinforced with economic liberation.

The changing world order and the reflection of the legacy today

Unfortunately, starting from the 1980s, within the framework of neoliberal economic policies that came to dominate the world, institutions like Sümerbank, SEKA, and Etibank were downsized or closed down through privatization. For example, SEKA effectively ended in 2005, and Sümerbank in 2002. However, the greatest legacy these institutions left behind was ensuring that the industry had a certain accumulation of knowledge and a culture of the working class.

Today, the foundations of Türkiye's success in areas ranging from automotive to defense industry lie in the modest but determined steps taken in that era.

The industrial drive of the Atatürk era was not merely a development strategy, but also the economic reflection of the Republic's philosophy of independence. Factories, banks, and institutions were the building blocks of the ideal of building an independent, strong, and dignified society. Whatever the fate of these institutions in the historical process, the path they opened will remain in memory as a turning point in Türkiye's industrialization journey.

Türkiye’s Quest for Secularism and a Society’s Demand for Change

Special Analysis

Executive Summary

This report examines the historical roots of secularism in Türkiye, its foundational role in the Republican project, its current standing under contemporary socio-political dynamics, and the emerging demands of a public calling for political transformation. Beyond a simple separation of mosque and state, secularism in Türkiye serves as the bedrock for equal citizenship, women’s rights, scientific education, and social cohesion. By analyzing the societal impact of more than two decades of religious discourse and institutional shifts under the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), this analysis outlines the contours of the inclusive, liberal secularism required for Türkiye’s second century.

1. From Ottoman Decline to the Republic — The Secular Necessity and Atatürk’s Vision

Unlike Western Europe’s history of direct confrontation between Church and State, the idea of secularism in Türkiye emerged from the institutional decay and urgent modernizing drives of the late Ottoman Empire (Mardin, 1991, p. 45). Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Ottoman reforms — spanning the Tanzimat era (1839) and the Constitutional periods (1876, 1908) — attempted to institute secular legal and educational branches alongside traditional ones. Yet this dual system of religious (sharia) and secular (nizamiye) courts, paired with a fragmented educational landscape, crippled national integration and political unity (Berkes, 2017, p. 210).

Following the collapse of the empire, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the founding leaders of the Republic viewed the rationalization of state authority and public life as essential to securing the new nation-state’s survival and elevating it to the level of “contemporary civilization.” Secularism became the vehicle for disentangling state governance and law from divine doctrine, anchoring them instead in reason and scientific inquiry (Akşin, 2007, p. 112).

The key reformist milestones establishing Turkish secularism unfolded systematically across several critical years:

* March 3, 1924 — The Law on Unification of Education (Tevhid-i Tedrisat): Standardized national schooling, closed religious seminaries (madrasas), and mandated a secular curriculum grounded in modern science.

* March 3, 1924 — Abolition of the Caliphate and the Ministry of Religious Affairs: Completely secularized political authority and dismantled the office of the Sheikh ul-Islam.

* February 17, 1926 — Adoption of the Turkish Civil Code: Replaced sharia law with a modern legal framework modeled on the Swiss Civil Code, laying the foundation for gender equality before the law.

* February 5, 1937 — Constitutional Enshrining of Secularism: Formally designated secularism as an unalterable core feature of the Republic under Article 2 of the Constitution.

Photo by Mehmet Can Özgümüş on Unsplash

2. Secularism as a Shield for Social Cohesion

Far from being a mere tool of state oversight over religion (akin to classical French-style laïcité), secularism in Türkiye evolved into a vital guarantee for individual freedom of conscience and social stability. In a country composed of diverse ethnic, religious, and sectarian identities, secularism acts as a neutral framework ensuring the state maintains equal distance from all faith groups and non-believers alike (Kongar, 1998, p. 185).

2.1. Equal Citizenship and the Neutral Public Square

When state authority anchors its legitimacy in a single religious interpretation, citizens outside that dominant fold face systemic marginalization. Secularism grounds state legitimacy in a shared constitutional social contract rather than divine decrees, safeguarding the principle of equal citizenship for every member of society (Savran, 2004, p. 89).

2.2. Women’s Rights and Gender Equality

A secular legal order remains the indispensable prerequisite for female emancipation. The 1926 Civil Code outlawed polygamy, established women’s equal rights in divorce, inheritance, and child custody, and paved the way for full political suffrage in 1934. Universal standards of women’s rights cannot take root within legal systems dictated by religious dogma (Arat, 1998, p. 62).

3. Contemporary Socio-Political Dynamics: Evaluating the AKP Era

The uninterrupted tenure of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) since 2002 represents a profound pivot in Turkish state-society relations and the practical application of secularism. Though the AKP initially campaigned on promises of a “passive” or “liberal” secular model, its governance gradually shifted toward a pervasive re-Islamization of state apparatuses and public discourse (Çavdar & Yaşar, 2019, p. 145).

3.1. Institutional Islamization and the Merit Crisis

Over two decades, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) saw its budget and public presence expand exponentially, emerging as an influential voice in legislative and executive affairs. In education, the rapid expansion of religious (İmam Hatip) schools and state protocols (such as ÇEDES) assigning clerics to public classrooms progressively eroded secular schooling standards (İnal, 2015, p. 202). In the civil service, party loyalty and religious brotherhood affiliations routinely superseded professional merit — a dynamic that led directly to severe institutional breakdowns, most notably witnessed during the July 15, 2016 coup attempt.

3.2. Polarization and Top-Down Social Engineering

The political leadership’s explicit ambition to raise a “pious generation” deepened political and cultural fault lines. The strategic deployment of state resources to favor a specific lifestyle heightened anxieties among secular segments of society, fueling feelings of disenfranchisement and cultural polarization (Keyder, 2014, p. 98).

4. The Growing Public Appetite for Political Change

Despite heavy state-sponsored religious engineering, demographic trends and field research reveal a distinct trend toward organic secularization, particularly among Türkiye’s younger generations (Konda, 2021). The broad public demand for political change is increasingly driven by calls for rational governance, economic fairness, and the restoration of the rule of law.


The public’s call for reform is not a desire to resurrect the heavy-handed, assertive secularism (laïcisme) of the 1990s. Instead, society demands an inclusive, passive, and democratic secularism (Kuru, 2009, p. 42) — one that safeguards the religious rights of believers while shielding non-believers from societal pressure and guaranteeing absolute state neutrality.

5. Conclusion: Secularism in Türkiye’s Second Century

As the Republic of Türkiye enters its second century, secularism is far more than a historical artifact; it is a vital prerequisite for democracy, national unity, and modern progress. Navigating the country out of its current socio-political impasse requires re-anchoring state institutions in science and reason.

The widespread demand for change reflects a fundamental desire for justice, personal freedom, and higher living standards. Secularism provides the only common ground capable of unifying Türkiye’s diverse demographic fabric. By restoring a secular rule of law and a merit-based administration, Türkiye can achieve sustainable socioeconomic development and reclaim its respected standing on the global stage.

References

* Akşin, S. (2007). Kısa Türkiye Tarihi [A Short History of Türkiye]. Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
* Arat, N. (1998). Türkiye’de Kadın Hakları ve Laiklik [Women’s Rights and Secularism in Türkiye]. Istanbul: Say Yayınları.
* Berkes, N. (2017). The Development of Secularism in Türkiye. Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları.
* Çavdar, A., & Yaşar, A. (2019). AKP Döneminde Devlet ve Din [State and Religion in the AKP Era]. Ankara: İletişim Yayınları.
* İnal, K. (2015). Eğitimde Dinselleşme: AKP Dönemi Eğitim Politikaları [Islamization of Education: AKP Era Educational Policies]. Istanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları.
* Keyder, Ç. (2014). State and Class in Türkiye. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
* Konda Research. (2021). TR100: Youth Research in Türkiye. Istanbul: Konda Publications.
* Kongar, E. (1998). 21. Yüzyılda Türkiye [Türkiye in the 21st Century]. Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.
* Kuru, A. T. (2009). Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and Türkiye. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
* Mardin, Ş. (1991). Religion and Politics in Türkiye. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
* Savran, G. (2004). Civil Society and Secularism. Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları.