Turkish politics has recently been shaken by a rare earthquake. The historic fracture within the Republican People's Party (CHP), which has maintained its position as the main opposition for over two decades, has virtually redrawn the political map. The "New Party" (Yeni Parti), founded by Özgür Özel after he was ousted from the CHP leadership, has quickly become the second-largest power in parliament, causing a reshuffling of the cards in the race for power. So, does this new political entity have the potential to end President Erdoğan's grip on power that has lasted for over two decades?

The Historic Rift in the CHP and the Birth of the New Party

To understand the process, we need to look at the recent past. Taking over the leadership of the CHP in 2023, Özgür Özel brought a breeze of renewal to the party, and this synergy enabled the CHP to surpass the ruling AK Party and become the leading party in the March 2024 local elections for the first time in 22 years. Retaining and winning many metropolitan cities, especially Istanbul, had allowed hopes to blossom on the opposition front.

However, Özel's removal from the chairmanship by a court decision in May and the reinstatement of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu—who had led the party to many defeats in the past—broke the camel's back. Following this process, which many independent observers and human rights organizations interpreted as the "weaponization of the justice system" Özel charted his own path and founded the "New Party" on July 24th.

Splitting parties is not a new phenomenon in Turkish politics. But what made this split historic was its sheer scale. Following Özgür Özel's call, 90 of the CHP's 135 MPs defected to the New Party. While the CHP shrank to the fifth-largest party in parliament with 44 seats, the New Party suddenly took the main opposition seat. Moreover, the fact that Ekrem İmamoğlu—the popular political figure who declared his second victory in Istanbul in 2024 and is currently in the crosshairs of a political ban due to ongoing lawsuits—left his 17-year CHP past behind to join the New Party completely changed the political balance. Polls show the CHP's vote share plummeting below 5%, while the New Party has soared above 30%, making it the AK Party's most serious rival.

Political Balances and 2028 Scenarios

Technically, President Erdoğan's current term expires in 2028, and according to the constitution, parliament must call an early election for him to run again. Many experts expect exactly this to happen. In a potential election, the main factor determining the New Party's chances will be its ability to build a broad "coalition."

At first glance, a divided opposition might seem to benefit the ruling party. For the New Party to overcome this disadvantage, it must go beyond the secular and social democratic base it inherited from the CHP. It needs to establish a wider alliance bloc that encompasses the center-right, nationalists, and Kurdish voters. However, the government's potential reintroduction of a peace process with the PKK carries the risk of detaching actors like the DEM Party from the opposition bloc and further fragmenting it. This situation will be one of the biggest political tests ahead for the New Party.

The Economic Picture and Historical Repetition

In the shadow of political turmoil, the Turkish economy is also facing a tough test. The Central Bank raising its year-end inflation target from 16% to 24%, the sharp 6% drop in the stock market following Özgür Özel's removal from the CHP leadership, and the Turkish Lira's continued slide against the dollar are all factors weakening the government's hand. Judicial crackdowns spooking investors and this fragility in the economy create a significant advantage for the opposition.

On the other hand, it is also possible to draw a historical parallel. The Democrat Party, which broke away from the CHP in 1946, marched to power just four years later, in 1950. The leadership profile of Özgür Özel, who revived the opposition after the disappointment of 2023, could provide the momentum the New Party needs to repeat this history.

A Judicial Vise or a March to Power?

The rise of the New Party has inevitably entered the radar of both the government and the judiciary. The preparation of a summary of proceedings against Özgür Özel on bribery allegations and the request to lift his parliamentary immunity just two weeks after his party's establishment are harbingers of the storm on the horizon.

However, political history shows that pressure and crackdowns do not always yield the desired results. President Erdoğan's own political adventure did not end with the prison sentence he received while serving as the Mayor of Istanbul in the 1990s; on the contrary, it carried him to the Prime Ministry in 2003 and a twenty-year rule thereafter.

If the New Party can withstand the judicial and political pressures, gather the divided opposition under a broad umbrella, and correctly channel the social reaction created by the economic crisis, a potential early election in the coming years could set the stage for a change of hands after a two-decade-long rule.

Contemporary Türkiye is currently navigating one of the most critical junctures in its republican history. The prolonged convergence of political and economic crises renders the sociological metaphor of the "final exit before the bridge" increasingly salient. While the Justice and Development Party (AKP) administration's two-decade tenure initially garnered public support through paradigms of economic growth and institutional reform, the policy trajectories ultimately adopted have driven the nation into a profound systemic impasse.

Photo Craig Adderley on Pexels

Macroeconomic unorthodoxy and deep poverty

A primary locus of criticism regarding the incumbent government involves its departure from rational macroeconomic principles. The persistent application of unorthodox economic theses fundamentally incongruent with universal economic science—most notably the assertion that "interest rates are the cause and inflation is the result"—has precipitated a historic depreciation of the Turkish Lira (₺). Consequently, Türkiye is currently experiencing not merely chronic inflation, but a severe structural reality of deep poverty.

Amidst the erosion of the middle class and a precipitous decline in purchasing power, fundamental necessities such as adequate housing and nutrition have been relegated to the status of luxury. As lower-income demographics struggle for basic subsistence, income inequality has widened to unprecedented levels within the republic's history.

Democratic erosion and the rule of law

This economic degradation is not an incidental byproduct; rather, it is a direct manifestation of institutional decay and democratic backsliding. The de facto eradication of the separation of powers and the centralization of authority under the Presidential Government System have effectively dismantled systemic checks and balances.

Within this trajectory, freedom of the press has sustained the most severe damage. Independent journalists endeavoring to inform the public regarding governmental missteps, corruption allegations, or the true magnitude of the economic crisis face systematic suppression through detentions, incarcerations, and censorship legislation. The press's normative function as the Fourth Estate has been largely supplanted by a governmental echo chamber. The systemic conflation of journalistic activity with ambiguous legal charges—such as "terrorism" or "inciting public hatred and enmity"—has emerged as the most coercive instrument suppressing freedom of expression.

The judicialization of politics and interference with the electorate's will

Free elections and a fair competitive environment, the foundational prerequisites of any democratic system, have been severely compromised by the politicization of the judiciary. The administration's concerted efforts to neutralize its most formidable political adversaries via judicial mechanisms—in order to mitigate the risk of electoral defeat—constitute a profound regression in the nation's political history.

The strategic deployment of unfounded indictments, political bans, and direct penal sentences to sideline opposition leaders and municipal mayors who possess significant public backing and the electoral potential to challenge President Erdoğan represents an intervention not merely against these individuals, but against the democratic will of millions of voters. The instrumentalization of the judiciary to eliminate political competition serves as the most explicit indicator of Türkiye's profound detachment from universal legal norms.

Türkiye is compelled to break free from this self-perpetuating cycle of economic devastation, systemic lawlessness, and authoritarianism. The accumulating societal grievances and the demand for change across diverse demographic strata indicate an urgent imperative to return to the nation's democratic foundations. Achieving economic prosperity is inherently unfeasible within a paradigm where the rule of law is absent, press freedom is curtailed, and political competitors are coerced with incarceration. The impending epoch constitutes the "final exit"—a critical threshold where Türkiye will either recalibrate its trajectory toward contemporary democracy or descend further into this authoritarian tunnel.