An Analysis Through the Case of the CHP

In modern democracies, the judiciary is expected to act as a balancing power under the principle of the separation of powers. However, in the recent political climate of Türkiye, criticisms regarding the judiciary becoming an instrument of the executive branch have been increasingly reflected in international reports. The legal pressures exerted on the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and other opposition elements should be viewed not merely as isolated cases, but as a systematic strategic maneuver.

Political Consolidation and the Marginalization of Alternatives

At the core of the ruling party’s moves against the main opposition lies the effort to push the rival into an “illegitimate” space. Investigations launched through judicial channels and demands for political bans (e.g., the cases of Ekrem İmamoğlu or Canan Kaftancıoğlu) aim to shake the credibility of opposition leaders in the eyes of the public and keep them on the agenda as “criminals/suspects”. This allows the government to consolidate its own voter base while forcing the opposition into a permanent defensive posture.

Local Governments and Control of Economic Resources

Since the 2019 local elections, the CHP’s victory in major metropolitan municipalities has dealt a significant blow to the long-standing economic and social distribution networks of the ruling AKP. Judicial sieges directed at mayors — including appointments of trustees, frequent inspections, and bureaucratic obstacles — aim to limit the opposition’s capacity to provide services. The goal is to signal to the electorate that “the opposition cannot govern” and to prevent the success stories of local governments from carrying over into general elections.

Political Engineering and the Candidate Selection Process

Judicial pressure carries the potential to sideline the opposition’s strongest actors. In particular, the threat of “political bans” creates uncertainty within the opposition bloc, potentially leading to strategic errors and internal competition. By narrowing the opposition’s options through the judiciary, the government aims to enter election cycles under its own preferred conditions and against desired candidates.

Photo by Serra Utkum İkiz on Unsplash

Deterring Social Opposition

The judiciary’s harsh stance toward opposition politicians affects not only those individuals but also the general public and non-governmental organizations. Heavy sentences or ongoing investigations aim to suppress the desire for active dissent and protest culture by creating a “climate of fear” across broad segments of society.

The pressure exerted by the AKP on the opposition, particularly the CHP, using judicial tools can be evaluated as part of a “survival” strategy rather than a standard democratic competition. While this situation leads to the erosion of Türkiye’s democratic institutions, it also makes it difficult for politics to normalize and be discussed on a rational basis. Using the judiciary as a political tool may provide short-term advantages for the government, but in the long run, it poses a risk of turning into a structural crisis that undermines trust in state institutions.

 Why Is Cultural Heritage Left to Its Fate in Türkiye?

In many European cities, driving a single nail into the facade of a centuries-old building carries heavy sanctions. In Anatolia, often called the “cradle of civilizations” the situation is starkly different. On one hand, we see highways cutting through millennia-old ancient cities; on the other, fortress walls defaced with spray paint. So, what lies at the heart of this indifference toward cultural heritage in a geography where history literally bursts from the soil?

The “Rote Learning” Barrier and Historical Consciousness

In Türkiye, history education is generally viewed as a chronological sequence of wars and treaties. Students aren’t taught that an ancient city isn’t just a “pile of stones” but a memory card reflecting the engineering, art, and social philosophy of its era. When history remains trapped within four classroom walls, individuals fail to see the artifacts they encounter outside as a part of themselves. Instead, they code them as “relics belonging to the state”. Without a sense of belonging, the instinct to protect never awakens.

Short-Term Rent and the Growing Pains of Modernization

While Europe views its historical fabric as the city’s identity and a primary tourism asset, in Turkey, it is often perceived as an “obstacle” to modernization. Finding historical remains during a construction excavation often triggers fear that “work will be delayed” rather than excitement. This is the result of social consciousness being crushed under economic concerns and uncontrolled urbanization. Yet, as seen in examples like Rome or Florence, preserving the past is the greatest investment for the future.

Ignorance and the Myth of Treasure Hunting

The most tangible and destructive reflection of lack of education is “treasure hunting”. The shattering of millennia-old sarcophagi based on hearsay legends, solely in hopes of finding “gold” is not just ignorance — it is cultural suicide. The market value of a piece of metal inside an artifact is negligible compared to the knowledge that artifact offers to human history. However, this vision can only be built through an education in archaeology and art culture starting from a young age.

The Core Difference with Europe: “Heritage” or “Trust”?

In European countries, historical monuments are accepted as “national treasures” and citizens see themselves as guardians of this wealth. In Türkiye, this awareness has yet to spread to the grassroots level. As long as protecting historical artifacts is treated as the sole responsibility of ministries or museum officials, civil architecture examples in local neighborhoods — such as old mansions and fountains — will be doomed to vanish.

Photo by Andrew Neel on Unsplash

A Society Losing Its Memory

Protecting historical artifacts is not just respect for the past; it is a signature left for the future. A society that loses its memory also loses its identity. For Türkiye to protect this rich heritage like the “apple of its eye” it must move toward an education model based on field trips rather than theoretical lectures, and local people must be encouraged to benefit from this heritage sustainably through tourism.

Lest we forget, every column, every mosque, and every ancient theater rising on these lands is our title deed to this geography. Claiming our title is possible not only through laws but through conscience and education.

 The Case of akpden.com and Mathematical Facts

This article examines the taxation system applied in the Turkish automotive market, the calculations presented on the recently launched platform akpden.com, and how this tax burden reflects on actual costs.

Automotive Sector Taxes and Transparency

In Türkiye, items such as the Special Consumption Tax (ÖTV), Value Added Tax (KDV), and TRT banderole fees constitute the largest share in determining the final sales prices of vehicles. This situation, which has become a focal point of political and economic debate, has been brought to the public’s attention via digital platforms.

Launched to the public by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in May 2026, the akpden.com platform aims to visualize the extent of the tax burden through an example of vehicle pricing. This article details the data presented on the platform and the underlying mathematical framework of these calculations.

Purpose and Operation of the akpden.com Platform

The platform particularly addresses the difficulties young people and middle-income groups face in accessing technological products and automobiles from a tax-burden perspective. In the standard new car scenario presented on the site, the tax logic is laid out with the following core figures.

* Base Price (Ex-Tax Price): 1,200,000 Turkish Lira (₺)

* ÖTV (Special Consumption Tax) Amount: 1,088,000 Turkish Lira (₺)

* TRT Banderole Fee: 9,000 Turkish Lira (₺)

* KDV (Value Added Tax) Amount: 460,000 Turkish Lira (₺)

* Total Tax Burden: 1,557,000 Turkish Lira (₺)

* Final Sales Price: 2,757,000 Turkish Lira (₺)

Mathematical Accuracy and Tax Calculation Methods

The way the calculation on the site aligns with Turkish tax legislation and the resulting mathematical ratios should be evaluated from different perspectives.

Formation of the Cumulative Tax Base

In the Turkish tax system, KDV is not calculated solely on the tax-free base price; rather, it is applied to the tax base formed by the sum of the base price and other applicable taxes (ÖTV and legal fees).

KDV Base = Base Price + ÖTV + TRT Banderole Fee

Substituting the values above:

KDV Base = ₺1,200,000 + ₺1,088,000 + ₺9,000 = ₺2,297,000

When a 20% KDV is applied to this base:

KDV = 2,297,000 x 0.20 = ₺459,400

(The 460,000 Turkish Lira (₺) figure displayed on the site includes a rounding or smoothing difference of roughly 600 Turkish Lira (₺)).

Analysis of Actual Tax Ratios

Once the accuracy of the calculations is confirmed, we can assess the proportion of the final price represented by taxes from two different angles:

Tax Share in the Final Price

This ratio shows what proportion of the total 2,757,000 TL paid by the consumer goes to the state as tax:

Tax Ratio = Total Tax / Total Price x 100

Tax Ratio = 1,557,000 / 2,757,000 x 100 ≈ %56.47

Tax Burden Relative to the Base Price (Multiplier Effect)

This financial perspective illustrates how much tax multiplies the cost of the vehicle compared to the tax-free product value.

Tax Burden = Total Tax / Base Price x 100

Tax Burden} = 1,557,000 / 1,200,000 x 100 ≈ %129.75

Photo by Kelly Sikkema on Unsplash

Conclusion

Automotive sector taxation is one of the most significant macroeconomic variables directly determining the purchasing power of the end consumer. The data provided by the akpden.com platform — aside from minor rounding details — presents a framework that aligns with the logic of cumulative tax bases.

Consequently, it stands out as a transparent communication effort that mathematically clarifies individual asset accumulation and the costs of owning a car, particularly during inflationary periods.

 Türkiye’s Foreign Policy Willpower and Strategic Resilience

The 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation stands as one of the most critical turning points in the recent political and military history of the Republic of Türkiye. This operation not only protected the Turkish presence on the island but also demonstrated to the entire world Türkiye’s independent willpower to exercise its rights under international law, its alliance relations, and its own strategic decisions.

The diplomatic process leading up to the operation, the execution of the military intervention, and the subsequent embargoes imposed by the United States provide important lessons on how Türkiye should build its defense and foreign policy capacity.

The Process Leading to the Operation and Diplomatic Background

The two-communal partnership state established in Cyprus by the 1960 Zurich and London Agreements had been targeted through acts of violence and rendered inoperable since 1963, in line with the Greek Cypriot goal of Enosis (the union of the island with Greece). Although Türkiye had indicated its intention to intervene in the island in 1964 and 1967, it faced open obstruction from the US, most notably with the famous “Johnson Letter” in 1964.

On July 15, 1974, a coup d’état supported by Nikos Sampson, the leader of EOKA-B, aimed to completely destroy the Republic of Cyprus and annex the island. Upon this development, Türkiye resorted to diplomatic channels using its right of guarantee. The Turkish government, led by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and Deputy Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, first attempted to carry out a joint intervention with the United Kingdom, a guarantor state. When the UK evaded this responsibility, Türkiye launched the Cyprus Peace Operation on July 20, 1974.

The “Ayşe Can Go on Vacation” Passphrase and the Second Operation

The first phase of the operation was halted in compliance with the ceasefire call of the United Nations Security Council, and the Geneva Conference process began. However, the stalling tactics of Greece and the Greek Cypriot side at the conference, their efforts to buy time, and their practices that threatened the safety of the Turks on the island showed that diplomatic solutions had been exhausted.

Turan Güneş, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was conducting the negotiations in Geneva, realized that no results would emerge from the talks and communicated with Ankara. To prevent potential wiretapping, Güneş used a coded language and conveyed the following historic passphrase, bearing the name of his daughter, Ayşe, to the officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

“Ayşe can go on vacation.”

This passphrase served as the political signal to launch the Second Peace Operation on August 14, 1974. Thanks to the rapid and decisive advance of the Turkish Armed Forces, approximately thirty-five percent of the island was brought under control, laying the foundations of the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), which exists today.

US Embargoes and Türkiye’s Strategic Transformation

The 1974 operation brought one of the biggest rifts of the Cold War era in Türkiye’s relations with the United States. Türkiye’s decision to carry out the operation despite US dissuasion on an issue concerning its national security was met with a reaction in the US Congress.

* Aircraft and Weapon Supply Problems: The US administration and Congress decided to impose an arms embargo on Türkiye, which entered into force on February 5, 1975. The aircraft and spare parts that Türkiye had purchased from or ordered from the US were not delivered.

* Impact of the Embargo: During this process, the vulnerability of depending on a single country under the guise of a NATO alliance was clearly understood. The US embargo generated the need for Türkiye to reduce its foreign dependency in the defense industry.

Photo by Katerina Bot on Unsplash

Evaluation of the Correct Strategy

Türkiye’s 1974 strategy is interpreted along the axes of realism and determination in international relations.

1. Exercise of Rights Arising from Treaties: Instead of making a unilateral intervention, Türkiye used its right of guarantee from the 1960 Agreements as a legal basis.

2. Ability to Act Despite Allies: Despite US pressure and the threat of a potential embargo, Türkiye’s move in line with its national interests became the most concrete example of its independent foreign policy capacity.

3. National Industry Vision: In the long term, the US embargo laid the groundwork for the establishment of Türkiye’s own defense industry institutions (such as ASELSAN, TUSAŞ (TAI), and Havelsan) and the development of today’s modern, domestically produced infrastructure.

 A Roadmap for the First 100 Days After Political Transition

Strategic Vision and Institutional Preparation

First 100-Day Action Plan

Agricultural Inventory: Establishing a digital agricultural and soil inventory nationwide.

(Expected Impact: Planned production and prevention of resource waste.)

Cost Management: Restructuring agricultural subsidies for fertilizers, fuel, and seeds.

(Expected Impact: Alleviating the input costs of producers.)

Rural Employment: Cooperative incentives to retain the young population in rural areas.

(Expected Impact: Slowing down the rural-to-urban migration.)

Photo by Randy Fath on Unsplash

Implementation Model: A Vision from the Past

The collective and productive spirit of the Village Institutes must be combined with today’s modern agricultural technologies. The model below synthesizes these two perspectives.

Model: Sustainable Agricultural Development Network

1. Data-Driven Planning: Digitalizing agricultural production with an SPO vision.

2. Local Cooperatives: Ensuring producer-oriented market access.

3. Education and Technology: Transferring modern agricultural techniques to producers.

Conclusion and Future Projection

The agricultural sector in Türkiye is not merely an economic policy, but also a matter of national security and independence. With a comprehensive transformation, rural areas can once again become centers of attraction.